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RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

by

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Religious organizations (ROs) in Pakistan have a socio-economic link with society because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society. Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to the political and social context in the country. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state's interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to extremism.		

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RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

Religious organizations (ROs) in Pakistan have a socio-economic link with society because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society. Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to the political and social context in the country. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state's interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to extremism.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIML	All India Muslim League
ASWJ	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat
JEM	Jaish-e-Muhammed
JI	Jamat-i-Islami
JUD	Jam'at ud Dawa
JUH	Jamiat-Ulamai-Hind
JUI	Jamiat-Ulama-i- Pakistan
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
ML	Muslim League
NAP	National Awami Party
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PIMA	Pakistan Islamic Medical Association
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNC	Pakistan National Congress
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RaD	Religion and Development
READ	Rural Education and Development
ROs	religious organizations
SMP	Sipah-e-Mohammadi Pakistan
ST	Sunni Tehrik
TJP	Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan
TPP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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I. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN

On 15 October 2005, within a week after the devastating earthquake that killed approximately 73,000¹ people in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)² and Azad Kashmir, Jama'at ud Dawa (JUD), a religious organization banned by the United States in 2003 as operating as an organized group with links to terrorists in Pakistan, had established relief camps and field hospitals equipped with X-ray machines and makeshift operation theaters.³ The organization was also effective in relief work during the refugee crisis emerging from Pakistan's counterterrorism operations in Swat and humanitarian disaster after the floods in 2009 and 2010, respectively.⁴ Despite being declared a terrorist organization by the international community, the Pakistani government supported and continues to support such extremist religious organizations.

JUD is an extremist organization, which was identified by the United States in 2003 as having links with terrorist organizations. Pakistan also placed the organization on its terrorism watchlist in late 2003.⁵ In 2009, the Pakistan government put a ban on JUD after the United Nations declared it as a terrorist group.⁶ At the same time, the organization was able to receive millions of rupees in funding from the provincial government in Punjab.⁷ State support for such organizations often raises the question of

¹ UNICEF, "UNICEF Pakistan Support to Recovery and Rehabilitation of Basic Social Services for the Earthquake-Affected Population 2007–2008," UNICEF, 1 September 2007, [www.unicef.org/pakistan/Overview-Updated-September-2007-1_\(2\).pdf](http://www.unicef.org/pakistan/Overview-Updated-September-2007-1_(2).pdf).

² The province of NWFP has been renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010, see Sama TV, "Senate Approved Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Name of NWFP," *Sama TV*, 15 April 2010, <http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/15-Apr-2010/senate-approved-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-name-of-nwfp>.

³ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Extremists Fill Aid Chasm after Quake," *Washington Post*, 16 October 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/AR2005101501392.html>.

⁴ Rob Crilly, "Pakistan Flood Aid from Islamic Extremists," *Telegraph*, 21 August 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7957988/Pakistan-flood-aid-from-Islamic-extremists.html>; Declan Walsh, "Banned Jihadi Group is Running Aid Programme for Swat Refugees," *Guardian*, 13 May 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/13/pakistan-aid-terrorism>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Bill Roggio, "UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group," *Long War Journal* (11 December 2008), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/un_declares_jamaatud.php#.

⁷ News report, "Sherry Rehman Resents Grant Given to Jamaat ud Dawa," *Express Tribune*, 18 June 2010, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/22210/sherry-rehman-resents-grant-given-to-jamaat-ud-dawa/>.

the government's intentions and "double faced" policy. Yet very little research has been done on why that is the case. Understanding the imperatives that push the state into supporting these groups at times is critical for understanding religious extremism in Pakistan, which is the foundation of terrorism in Pakistan. How and why are these organizations spreading extremism despite state attempts to control them?

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis intends to answer the question of how religious organizations in Pakistan contribute to extremism in society. In doing so, it will focus on selective religious organizations (ROs), how and why these institutions have become more extreme in their ideology, and what is the historical context, including external and internal influences, that has led to extremism. Moreover, this thesis will examine the ROs' influence on and connections to civil society. It is also important to understand the state's relationship with the ROs in order to see what kind of leverage it exercises on the ROs, and vice versa, as well how the ROs' demands shape the state's responses. Such a study will enable an understanding of ROs' influence on Pakistani national politics.

Religious organizations in Pakistan have a significant influence over particular segments of society, which they can mobilize for their objectives, and at times, this mobilization is quite violent, as shown by anti-Musharraf protests and others in 2005 and 2008.⁸ This influence is due to the fact that the ROs in Pakistan have extensive socio-economic welfare programs through which they offer free education along with free boarding and lodging in *madrasas* (religious schools).⁹ Some ROs also organize weddings and arrange for burials for the poor.¹⁰ Moreover, a few ROs run charity

⁸ News report, "Thousands Protest in Pakistan," *Guardian*, 19 December 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/20/pakistan>.

⁹ Christopher M. Blanchard, *Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background* (CRS Report No. RS21654) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 23 January 2007): 4, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf>.

¹⁰ Masooda Bano, "Marker of Identity: Religious Political Parties and Welfare Work—The Case of Jama'at-i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh," Research and Development Research Program, Working Paper 34, University of Oxford (2009): 19, http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1254137609_working_paper_34.pdf.

hospitals and pay for healthcare for those who cannot afford it. Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman observe that:

From Egypt and Palestine to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, radical Islamist groups have enjoyed broad support—especially among the poorer segments of society—because they are major suppliers of mutual aid and social service.¹¹

There appear to be several such socio-economic linkages between the ROs and the poor in Pakistan, because the poor often rely on ROs for education and aid at times of crisis. There is, however, not much empirical research done on this linkage. This relationship is critical for understanding politics in Pakistan. According to a report on Islamic parties in Pakistan published by the International Crisis Group, “they [the ROs] have disproportionately influenced domestic policy … through the use of street power and violence, often successfully pressuring civilian governments into abandoning promised reforms or making concessions that forward an Islamist agenda.”¹² This thesis will explain how the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the society and have been able to rally public support. It also aims to cover the socio-economic aspects of the ROs—a neglected subject in the field of research—to find out how they impact the society.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a considerable amount of literature has emerged to understand Islamic radicalism and to find remedies that can effectively counter this threat to global security. A lot of literature has focused on the character of Islam as a religion and Islamic radical groups, yet very few have actually focused on the Islamic organizations that people come across in their daily lives. This paper proposes to fill that gap by looking at some of the organizations that interact with society and studying how they have evolved and become connected to extremists’ ideas.

¹¹ Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly,” *Public Choice* 128, no. 1/2 (July 2006): 119.

¹² International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan” International Crisis Group, 25, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216-islamic-parties-in-pakistan.aspx>.

This question will also allow us to focus on extremism, which is the root of the problem, versus the religion itself. In the past thirteen years, scholars generally agree that Islam as a religion does not promote terrorism, though terrorists use religious symbols to link terrorism with Islam.¹³ Thomas J. Badey argues that “as ideologies, religions do not cause violence. They are systems of belief that mobilize populations toward common objectives and justify their behavior in the pursuit of these objectives.”¹⁴ Adam L. Silverman, a social science advisor to the U.S. Army, notes that, “it is clear that much of the so-called Islamic behavior that the West terms terrorism is outside the norms that Islam holds for political violence.”¹⁵ However, Islamic radicals often justify their acts of terrorism by propagating the idea that the fight against the West and its allied governments in Muslim countries is *jihad*.¹⁶ They argue that it is incumbent on all Muslims to participate in this *jihad* in order to be good Muslims. Most of the scholars and policy makers have focused on terrorism as a threat to international peace; however, it can be argued that terrorism is only a symptom of the deep-rooted problems of extremism.¹⁷ Extremist religious organizations provide the “supporting environment” to terrorists that provides “support and sympathy” to the terrorists.¹⁸ Emma Hooper notes that, “it is the failure to address extremism, militant and sectarian violence that has led to a vicious cycle of creeping radicalism, to a deeply disturbing extent.”¹⁹ Therefore, this

¹³ Rodney Wilson, “Islam and Terrorism,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 2 (August 2007): 203–213, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20455506>.

¹⁴ Thomas J. Badey, “The Role of Religion in International Terrorism,” *Sociological Focus* 35, no. 1 (February 2002): 84.

¹⁵ Adam L. Silverman, “Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence,” *Journal of Church and State* 44, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 91, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/59878360?accountid=12702>.

¹⁶ Bernard Lewis, *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 6 (November–December 1998): 14–15, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049126>.

¹⁷ Todd Sandler, “New Frontiers of Terrorism Research: An Introduction,” *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 3, Special Issue: New Frontiers of Terrorism Research (May 2011): 279–286, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23035427>.

¹⁸ Peter Waldmann, “Ethnic and Socioevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” *International Social Movement Research* 4 (1992): 243.

¹⁹ Emma Hooper, “Pakistan: Back to the Future?” *Notes International CIDOB* 91 (June 2014), http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39500/608345/file/NOTES+91_HOOPER_ANG%282%29.pdf.

thesis proposes to expand our understanding of the causes of extremism and organizations that then transfer it to society.

In the studies of terrorism and extremism, Pakistan has gained special attention because of its “frontline” position and proximity to Afghanistan, and its involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War, which produced some of the extremists the world is confronting today.²⁰ Terrorists continue to use Pakistan’s porous borders to move between the local population of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which undermines the U.S. and Pakistan’s efforts to combat these terrorists.²¹ It is therefore important to understand how these terrorists get support from society. A detailed study of selected ROs in Pakistan will broaden our understanding of what is occurring at the grassroots societal level in Pakistan.

A study conducted by the Pew Research Center finds Pakistan among the top ten countries with very high social hostilities involving religion.²² While ROs might not agree with the use of violent tactics by the terrorists, they do, however, support the overarching agenda of enforcing Sharia law in the country because they believe that religious laws will alleviate poverty and injustice. This thesis will attempt to make that connection clear and show that a society that supports the ROs also ends up supporting terrorist organizations that are involved in anti-state activities. Thomas J. Badey comments that religious ideologies can become a way of organizing hatred against existing social and political systems.²³

Religious extremism also leads to sectarian violence, which has claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan. A report by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre notes that up to 4000 people have died in sectarian violence between mid-1980s and early

²⁰ Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, *Terrorism: What the Next President Will Face* (July 2008): 32.

²¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan* (New York: Viking, 2012).

²² Brian J. Grim, “Rising Restrictions on Religion: One-third of the World’s Population Experiences an Increase,” Pew Research Center (August 2011): 16–17, <http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Government/RisingRestrictions-web.pdf>.

²³ Badey, “The Role of Religion in International Terrorism,” 84.

2000s.²⁴ Between 2007 and 2011, there was a sharp increase in sectarian terrorism, which claimed the lives of 1,649 people.²⁵ Therefore, religious extremism is a serious threat to Pakistan's internal security.

Religious organizations in Pakistan have become more extreme in their ideology while maintaining considerable influence in society. They draw their strength from their connection to a sizeable segment of society through which they exert pressure on the state to adopt extremist policies. The role of ROs in making Pakistan an Islamic state is well known; their subsequent success in pressurizing Z.A. Bhutto to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims and include clauses in 1973 constitution to enforce Sharia law is also widely known.²⁶ Later, in 1983, General Zia accepted their demand of passing Hudood Ordinance, which restricts women's rights.²⁷ ROs in Pakistan are a significant factor, which have compelled the state to adopt extremist policies and influence society. This thesis will demonstrate that these ROs, over a period-of-time, have become more extreme in their ideology because of specific external and internal reasons, such as the Soviet-Afghan War and hyper competition among the Pakistani elite. This thesis will then illustrate their social links that propagate extremism in society, as well as their influence in state activities.

The socio-economic link between ROs and society is understudied in academia, as is the reason some organizations promote extreme ideas. This gap in research restricts our understanding of how some ROs contribute to expanding extremism in society and how the state then responds to this. This thesis will try to cover the gap by establishing the socio-economic link between ROs and society and how that contributes to overall extremism.

²⁴ Huma Yusuf, "Sectarian Violence: Pakistan's Greatest Security Threat," *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre* (July 2012): 3, www.peacebuilding.no/.../949e7f9b2db9f947c95656e5b54e389e.pdf.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Riaz Hassan, "Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan," *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no. 3 (July 1985): 264, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283071?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

²⁷ Ibid., 268.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the beginning of the American-led Global War on Terror, there has been a lot of research on terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism.²⁸ Yet, most of it can be put in the category of research on political groups that are fighting the state or the U.S. (for example, Al Qaida and Taliban). Such research does not, however, answer the very important question of how society is connected to the ROs, which is essential for understanding the constraints on the state as well shaping state behavior. Without understanding what connects terrorists and Pakistani society, we may not understand what the Pakistani state can do and what it cannot. This literature review therefore will first review literature on terrorism and extremism, and then specifically on Pakistan and its society, in order to understand what is needed in terms of further research.

1. Rational Choice Approach as a Foundation

This thesis will use the rational choice approach to explain the link between ROs and the society. The rational choice approach is based on the premise that “within the limits of their information and understanding, restricted by available options, guided by their preferences and tastes, humans attempt to make rational choices.”²⁹ This thesis will see ROs as rational actors who try to maximize their benefits by increasing their membership. The religious organizations operate in a mutually competitive environment and strive for monopoly over religion because the group that will have the monopoly would be the legitimate representative of religion in the country. This will also give that group the authority and legitimacy to influence the state to pass policies in favor of the RO. The rational choice approach explains that the mutually competitive environment causes ROs to promote extremism.³⁰

It can be argued that all organizations behave rationally, but it is important to contextualize the ROs through the rational choice approach because this will explain why

²⁸ Sandler, “New Frontiers of Terrorism.”

²⁹ Stephen Sharot, “Beyond Christianity: A Critique of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion from a Weberian and Comparative Religions Perspective,” *Sociology of Religion* 63, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 429, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/57145309?accountid=12702>.

³⁰ Kent D. Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations,” *Strategic Management Journal* 23, no. 5 (May 2002): 438, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094476?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

the ROs behave in a certain way. For example, rational choice explains why some of the ROs promote extremism and why they strive to increase their support. Other social theories about religious extremism are also important to understand why individuals adopt a particular religion or sect, but this thesis is focused on organizations rather than individuals, and therefore it will be appropriate to view the ROs as rational actors in a market place of ideologies. This will help in an objective understanding of ROs to explain how some extremist ROs contribute to extremism.

Laurence R. Iannaccone, who took the rational choice theory beyond individuals to organizations, proposes that “religious ‘producers’ are also viewed as optimizers—maximizing members, net resources, government support, or some other basic determinant of institutional success.”³¹ Therefore, the ROs will be discussed in terms of producers, which aim to maximize benefits to achieve their objectives. Similarly, society and state will also be depicted as rational actors trying to maximize their gains. It may be noted that this thesis will not contextualize religion, *per se*, as an economic commodity as some proponents of the Rational Choice Theory of Religion suggest.³² Rather, this argues that ROs, society and the state operate in a competing market place and that the ROs struggle among each other to be the most profitable producer. In doing so, they compete for more support from society and thus become an attractive commodity for the state to reach out to the general masses. ROs in Pakistan can be explained under this framework as they compete to be relevant to the state by expanding their influence over society. In doing so, they promote exclusionary ideologies and contribute to extremism. This research will further show how the competition among the ROs leads to promoting extremism in society, how much influence these ROs have on Pakistani society, and what segment or class of society supports ROs and why. What leverage do these institutions

³¹ Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34, no. 1 (March 1995): 77, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1386524>.

³² See, for example, Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert F. Hébert, “Interest Groups, Public Choice and the Economics of Religion,” *Public Choice* 142, no. 3/4, Essays in Honor of Robert D. Tollison (March 2010): 429–436, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40541978>; see also Steve Bruce, “Religion and Rational Choice: A Critique of Economic Explanations of Religious Behavior,” *Sociology of Religion* 54, no. 2, Theory and History in the Study of Religion (Summer 1993): 193–205; and Roger Finke and Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Supply Side Explanations for Religious Change,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 527 (May 1993): 27–39.

have on the state policies? Why does the state respond to the demands of these socially influential institutions to make extremist legislation? Answers to these questions will explain how the ROs in Pakistan have been able to promote extremism.

2. Religious Extremism

Most of the literature uses religious extremism and fundamentalism interchangeably; however, Douglas Pratt argues that there is an important distinction between these two concepts.³³ According to Pratt, “extremism suggests fanaticism” whereas fundamentalism relates to religio-political perspective found in many—if not all—major religions in the contemporary world.³⁴ The difference between extremism and terrorism is also evident from a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute whereby 10 percent of Pakistanis believed that terrorism was the most important issue, whereas 74 percent said that extremism was the most serious issue.³⁵ Lynn Davies observes that extremism is a derivative of fundamentalism, and that “the extremist’s mindset revolves around an absolutist claim to an authentic truth, coupled with the steady rejection of opposing opinions and beliefs.”³⁶ A better definition of extremism, attributed to Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s debate in Doha, Qatar, defines extremism as “when you do not allow for a different point of view; when you hold your own views as being quite exclusive, when you don’t allow for the possibility of difference.”³⁷ This definition describes a broader conception of religious intolerance that leads to violence and poses a security challenge. This thesis will use the aforementioned definition given by Archbishop Desmond Tutu because not all ROs are extremist organizations; some of them are just merely fundamentalists and this thesis will specifically focus on those.

³³ Douglas Pratt, “Religion and Terrorism: Christian Fundamentalism and Extremism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no.3 (2010): 438–456, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546551003689399>.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ International Republican Institute, “IRI Releases Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion International Republican Institute (IRI),” <http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-survey-pakistan-public-opinion-7>.

³⁶ Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no. 4 (2013): 69, <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/4>.

³⁷ Lynn Davies, *Education against Extremism* (Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2008).

3. Religious Extremism in Pakistan

Various scholars have approached religious extremism in Pakistan since September 11. Some of the scholars explain religious extremism in Pakistan because of military rule and an alliance between the military and religious militants to pursue security objectives and to legitimize the military's rule. Vali Nasr argues that military rulers made alliances with the ROs to legitimize their rule.³⁸ Hussain Haqqani also highlights the role of military in supporting religious groups for its own interests.³⁹ S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly support Haqqani's findings and argue that the use of militancy "is the centerpiece of a sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign."⁴⁰ These scholars argue that because the military regime needs legitimization, they make alliances with the ROs to grant themselves divine legitimacy. The military in Pakistan trained militants to fight against the Soviets during Soviet-Afghan War. To accomplish that, the military used the ROs as recruitment agencies. This thesis acknowledges that the state has been using ROs to promote *jihad* against the infidel communists in Afghanistan. This thesis will explore why the state needs ROs to legitimize its rule and pursue security objectives through them. While these scholars point to an important factor that elevated these organizations and even made them extreme, it does not really explain the societal support for these organizations, which then translates into extremism at the home front.

Another explanation of religious extremism relating it to foreign interventions and influences come from scholars like Aburish Said and Noam Chomsky.⁴¹ These scholars argue that militant extremism is partially a response to foreign occupation and influences in Muslim countries. This thesis builds on this explanation, because of the prevalent militant struggle against occupation in Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They

³⁸ Vali Nasr, "Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 196, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330001?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

³⁹ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

⁴⁰ Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012): 111–141, <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.

⁴¹ Said Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite* (London: Indigo, 1997); Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (Boston: South End Press, 1983); and Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005).

further argue that the extremist ROs in other countries use the sentiments of their population against occupation in other countries to mobilize support for themselves. For example, ROs in Pakistan ask for donations for *jihad* in other countries. Interestingly, their expenditure is not auditible and there is no proof that whether such funds were used for supporting *jihad* against foreign interventions or were consumed by the ROs to spread extreme views in their own country. This thesis argues that such ROs strive to acquire resources to increase their strength and support from society so that they can get concessions from the state. It will further demonstrate that such ROs promote extremism by calling for *jihad* in other countries and recruiting militants who can be used by these extremist ROs for their own purposes.

Significant research on extremism in Pakistan is focused on the role of *madrasas* (religious schools) in promoting extremism. Commentators such as Jessica Stern, Alan Richards, Hussain Haqqani, Ahmed Rashid, and Ali Riaz are a few of the scholars who draw a causal link between *madrasas* and extremism in Pakistan.⁴² This school of thought argues that *madrasas* have been indoctrinating young students with radical Islam. However, such claims have been refuted by scholars like Tahir Andarabi et al., Tariq Rahman, and Christine Fair who argue that *madrasas* have been unfairly blamed for promoting extremism and that these religious schools instead provide social services by educating the underprivileged.⁴³ Tahir Andarabi et al. have collected data on *madrasas* and students who enroll in these seminaries. The data shows that the numbers of

⁴² Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (November–December 2000): 115–126, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049971>; see also Jessica Stern, "Preparing for a War on Terrorism," *Current History* 100, no. 649 (2001): 355–357; Alan Richards, "At War with Utopian Fanatics," *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 4 (2001); Hussain Haqqani, "Islam's Medieval Outposts," *Foreign Policy* 133 (November–December 2002): 58–64, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183558>; See also Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008); and Ali Riaz, "Pakistan's Madrassahs: Teaching the Alphabets of Jihad," Working Paper No. 85, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP85.pdf.

⁴³ Tahir Andarabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data." *Comparative Education Review* 50, no. 3, Special Issue on Islam and Education—Myths and Truths, ed. Wadad Kadi and Victor Billeh (August, 2006): 446–477, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/503885>; Tariq Rahman, "Madrassas: Religion, Poverty, and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan," *Islamabad Policy Research Institute* 5 no. 1 (Winter 2005), <http://www.ipripak.org/journal/winter2005/madrassas.shtml>; Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 79–118, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v034/34.3.shapiro.html>.

madrasas in Pakistan are not significant and that empirical data disproves a link between poverty and enrollment in *madrasas*.⁴⁴ Based on these statistics, Christine Fair argues that “commonly suggested palliatives intended to reduce generalized support for militancy—economic development, greater democratization, alternatives to religious education, and so on—is unlikely to be effective.”⁴⁵ Andrabi and Fair’s findings have been challenged by scholars like Christopher Candland who observes that the number of *madrasas* in Pakistan are much more—19,104—than reported by Andrabi.⁴⁶ Candland further argues that *madrasas* have played a significant role in promoting extremism.⁴⁷ But *madrasas* are only one aspect of charity work by ROs. Arguably, while there is no doubt that *madrasas* have played an important role in producing radical “students” such as the Taliban, the focus on *madrasas* has detracted from other links between society and ROs. This thesis will explore other societal links that are as critical but also hidden to some extent.

Social welfare projects being run by ROs also need attention. However, little direct empirical data is available that can ascertain a correlation between ROs’ welfare work and society’s support. Jamat-i-Islami, for example, runs a welfare organization named Al-Khidmat that “runs hospitals, schools, women’s vocational centers, and emergency response units.”⁴⁸ Masooda Bano argues that “converting beneficiaries (through welfare programs) into voters is at most a secondary concern; instead the primary motive for the engagement in welfare work is to win the trust of party members by establishing the party’s commitment to the implementation of religious precepts.”⁴⁹ This claim by Bano, however, cannot be substantiated through empirical evidence, but at the same time, there is no empirical research available to justify that welfare work by

⁴⁴ Andrabi, “Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan.”

⁴⁵ Jacob N. Shapiro, and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 116, http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.3.shapiro.pdf.

⁴⁶ Christopher Candland, “Pakistan’s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education” in *Madrasa in South Asia: Teaching Terror?* ed. Jamal Malik (New York: Routledge, 2008): 102.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁹ Bano, “Marker of Identity,” 12.

ROs is intended to increase the support for ROs. Therefore, there remains a gap in research to understand the socio-economic influence of the welfare activities of the ROs. This thesis intends to cover this gap by showing that the ROs increase their support through welfare activities.

A seminal work in this regard has been undertaken by the Religions and Development Research Program Consortium (RaD), sponsored by the UK Department of International Development (DFID). RaD has carried out research on Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) in Pakistan and Bangladesh; the aim of this research is to understand the influence of welfare work by ROs in society. RaD's research explores whether the ROs perform welfare work to secure loyalty of its members to benefit in elections. The research is based on interviews with JI's leadership, and thus lacks empirical evidence; nonetheless, RaD's study suggests that exploring the influence of welfare work by ROs is worthy of dedicated research on the topic.⁵⁰ This thesis will establish the link between ROs' welfare work and support from society.

Unfortunately, establishing links between ROs and society through empirical data may not be possible because it is difficult to engage in direct field work. However, there is indirect evidence available through data from primary and secondary sources that was not intended specifically for understanding the link between ROs and society. For instance, newspaper articles connect ROs to charity work in regions where they have a stronghold. This thesis will also use data mostly from RaD's study, polls conducted by the International Republican Institute, earlier work done by scholars like Andrabi et al., Christine Fair, Jessica Stern, and P. W. Singer.⁵¹ The data will be analyzed to understand the social base of ROs and to demonstrate that the welfare work by ROs significantly contributes to maintaining their social base.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 12.

⁵¹ Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (November–December 2000): 115–126, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049971>; Religions and Development (RaD), <http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org>; The International Republican Institute, <http://www.iri.org/countries-and-programs/middle-east-and-north-africa/pakistan>; Peter Warren Singer, "Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad," Brookings Institution (November 2001), <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/pakistan-singer>.

Due to limited available data, this thesis will use the case study method by looking at selected ROs. Both JI and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are important organizations that are active in Pakistan and are well documented in the media. Moreover, JI and JUD have extensive networks of welfare activities through their welfare wings. Haroon K. Ullah, Humeira Iqtidar, Nasr, Bano, RaD, and the International Crisis Group have studied these two ROs in much detail and provided useful statistics that can be used for analysis in this thesis.⁵²

This thesis has academic and practical benefits. From an academic perspective, this work will demonstrate that the socio-economic link between ROs and the society is significant to understand how some of the extremist ROs garner support from society. This thesis will highlight the gaps in research work, which, if addressed, will broaden our understanding of religious extremism. From a practical perspective, this understanding can help in implementing sound policies aimed at minimizing the support for extremist ROs. In this regard, this paper can lead to better implementation of Pakistan's recently formulated National Policy on counterterrorism.⁵³

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Islamic extremism is one of the most serious security challenges facing Pakistan and the world. Promoting extremism in society leads to the use of violence. Sectarian violence and other acts of terrorism have claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan. It is therefore important to understand how extremism is being propagated in society. The causes of extremism in Pakistan have been attributed to regional wars and rivalries, natural sectarian divides in the country, state weakness (especially in tribal regions), Pakistan's support for anti-India militants in Kashmir, and Pakistan's co-operation with the United States in the War on Terror. While all of these factors contribute to extremism,

⁵² Haroon K. Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Humeira Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists? Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Vanguard of Islamic Revolution The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Religions and Development (RaD), <http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org>; and "Islamic Parties in Pakistan," International Crisis Group, Working Paper No. 216.

⁵³ Government of Pakistan, "National Internal Security Policy 2014–18," <http://nacta.gov.pk/#NISP>.

this thesis hypothesizes that the supporting environment for extremism is located in the local ROs. This thesis shows that the abovementioned factors can motivate individuals, but an organized base to mobilize these individuals is essential for terrorism.

This thesis emphasizes the role of ROs as providers of organized bases and a supporting environment to the disenfranchised masses, which mobilizes them as groups. It will be argued that the ROs capitalize on people's grievances and fill the void created by the state's ineffective social welfare programs to muster support from society. The ROs do so in a competitive environment to claim their monopoly over religion because the RO that has the monopoly over religion would be the legitimate beneficiary of the state's resources. This monopoly and legitimacy will also provide that RO with an influence over state policy.⁵⁴ Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this relationship.




Figure 1. State, Society, and ROs' Relation.

This thesis hypothesizes that the ROs in Pakistan have a socio-economic linkage with society because these institutions provide public goods and welfare to society. Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to the political and social context in the country. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs

⁵⁴ Iannaccone, "Voodoo Economics?" 77.

to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state's interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist laws. The following model explains the links among ROs, society, and the state:

Religious extremism is one of the most serious security challenges for Pakistan. Extremism in society allows for more radicalization that leads to the use of violence. It is therefore important to understand how extremism is being propagated in society.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis will use JI and JUD as a case study to demonstrate that ROs in Pakistan have considerable influence on society because of their socio-economic links. At the time of independence, JI was the most prominent religious organization in Pakistan. JI was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi in 1941, and since then it has maintained substantial support in terms of street power.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, JUD is known to be the new front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.⁵⁶ Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the founder of the organization, started Jamaat-ud-Dawa in 2002 after Lashkar was banned by the Pakistani government.⁵⁷ JUD also enjoys significant support from society and runs many charity works, which will be discussed in later chapters. This study of JI and JUD will illustrate the influence of ROs on society because they have been instrumental in compelling the state to adopt extremist policies, such as the declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims in 1974, and the passing of the Hudood Ordinance in 1983.⁵⁸ JI is also the largest and the

⁵⁵ Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, 3.

⁵⁶ "Pakistan Gave Funds to Group on UN Terror Blacklist," BBC South Asia, <http://www.bbc.com/news/10334914>.

⁵⁷ Roggio, "UN Declares Jamaat-ud-Dawa a Terrorist Front Group."

⁵⁸ The Objectives Resolution of 1948 provided basic guidelines for formulating the constitution of the newly created state of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution demanded that all laws of the country must be made in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The 1973 constitution was formulated under these broad guidelines, but it explicitly included clauses related to the Islamic character of the state and declared that Sharia laws were to be implemented in the country. The Hudood Ordinance of 1983 implemented Sharia law as interpreted by the Sunni Sect. See James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Pakistan* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 171, 207, 216.

most organized RO with an expansive network of welfare activities throughout the country.

The social welfare work being done by these organizations will be studied to understand the economic link between these ROs and society. The geographical location of welfare activities will be connected to social support for JI and JUD from these areas. This thesis will demonstrate that the areas where these ROs provide welfare goods are more prone to accept their ideology. Surveys conducted by RaD and Fair will be analyzed to make such a correlation, which will show how ROs influence society.⁵⁹

The evolution of JI and JUD into more hardline ideological organizations will also be examined. This thesis will explore why these ROs became more extreme in their ideology. Was it because of the demand from the society or a response to state policies? It will be argued that *ulema* (religious clerics) and religious organizations had co-existed with other religious communities in the subcontinent for centuries, but during the latter half of the twentieth century, they have increasingly become intolerant of other religions and sects. This thesis will explore the reasons why these ROs have changed their ideologies from relative tolerance to extremism.⁶⁰

The thesis will also attempt to understand the relationship between JI, JUD and the state. It will be demonstrated that the state has provided significant concessions to the demands by these ROs, such as adopting an Islamic constitution, declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims and implementing Sharia law through the Hudood Ordinance. This thesis will argue that such intolerant policies by the state add to the overall environment of extremism because exclusionary policies can lead to violent responses from minorities.⁶¹

⁵⁹ C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 76, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 712, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41684595>; Bano, "Marker of Identity."

⁶⁰ Kfir, "Sectarian Violence"; Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, "Religious Extremism"; and Miller, "Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations."

⁶¹ Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ashutosh Misra, "Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects," *Strategic Analysis* 27, no. 2 (2003), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160308450083>; and Vali R. Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 2 (2000).

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will focus on JI and JUD to demonstrate the role of ROs in contributing toward extremism in Pakistan. The paper will be divided in five chapters to answer these three essential questions: How are ROs linked with society? Why have ROs become more extreme in their ideology? How does the state respond to ROs?

Chapter II examines historical links between the religious organizations and society. This chapter will demonstrate the ROs (specifically, JI and JUD) that have maintained socio-economic links with a segment of society through welfare activities. Since the state has failed to provide basic social necessities, the ROs fill the void, which enables them to maintain influence over parts of society. Hence, they are able to influence groups and have support among the people, which affects state-society relations.

Chapter III investigates reasons for increasing extremism in religious organizations in Pakistan. It will be argued that the ROs had been relatively tolerant organizations and had co-existed with other religious communities in the subcontinent. After Pakistan gained Independence, the ROs saw an opportunity to establish influence over the state to make it a purely Islamic country. Despite the existence of these religious organizations since Independence, Pakistan did not see much religious terrorism until the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1980s. This chapter will examine the reasons for extremism in ROs, which come from domestic and foreign sources.

Chapter IV looks at the relations between the state and the ROs. This chapter illustrates that the state has needed the ROs to mobilize support in society. Since ROs have the power to garner street support from the society, they have been able to bargain with the state, which needs their support. This chapter will draw upon four significant events that demonstrate the state's acquiescence to the demands of ROs. These events include the Islamic character of the 1973 constitution, the passing of legislation to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims, the implementation of Sharia law through the Hudood Ordinance, and the Afghan-Soviet war. This chapter explains that the state's acceptance of extremist policies also contributes to extremism because such policies exclude

minority religions and sects that make these groups feel marginalized and forces them to resort to violence to fight for their rights.

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II. LINKAGE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN AND THE POOR

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the role of ROs in Pakistan, it is important to explain how the ROs in Pakistan have maintained links to the society. This chapter will explain how the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the society and how they have been able to rally public support. Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that the ROs in Pakistan are linked to the poor through their social services and welfare activities. Their influence on the poor makes them politically important for the state because the state needs these religious groups to mobilize the poor. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the historical legacies of charity work by the ROs. ROs in Pakistan have a legacy of conducting social welfare activities, which connects them with the poor. The second section will use JUD and JI to describe how these organizations are linked to the poor through their welfare programs. The third section explains that the ROs maintain their links to the poor to expand their influence by increasing the number of their members. This, in turn, increases their significance and their influence over the state.

The ROs in Pakistan have extensive socio-economic welfare programs through which they offer free education, along with room and board in *madrasas*.⁶² Some ROs also organize weddings and arrange for burials for the poor.⁶³ Finally, a few ROs run charity hospitals. There appear to be several such socio-economic links between ROs and the poor in Pakistan because the poor often rely on ROs for education and for aid during times of crisis. There is, however, not much empirical research done on this link. This relationship is critical for understanding politics in Pakistan. According to a report on Islamic parties in Pakistan published by the International Crisis Group, “they (the ROs) have disproportionately influenced domestic policy...through the use of street power and violence, often successfully pressuring civilian governments into abandoning promised

⁶² Blanchard, *Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background* (CRS Report No. RS21654) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 23, 2007).

⁶³ Bano, “Marker of Identity,” 19.

reforms or making concessions that forward an Islamist agenda.”⁶⁴ According to Zahid Hussain, a journalist, “the disturbing reality is that radical Islamic elements have as much—if not more—power over Pakistani society than the state.”⁶⁵ It is therefore important to explore how ROs in Pakistan have maintained their influence over society.

Pakistan is facing an internal security threat from religious extremism in the shape of sectarian violence and the struggle by some religious groups to establish control over the state. This struggle has been violent and has claimed thousands of lives.⁶⁶ It is therefore important to understand the historical context of religious groups in Pakistan and their connection to the population to better understand where these religious groups draw their support from and why. Such understanding can persuade policy makers to provide welfare to the poor, thereby cutting off the support for extremist religious groups.

B. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF CHARITY WORK BY ROs IN PAKISTAN

A study conducted by the Religion and Development Research Program notes that there is a historical link between religion and welfare activities in the subcontinent.⁶⁷ Religions in the area now called Pakistan have influenced charity work for over five centuries.⁶⁸ Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Sikhism, and Islam have influenced their followers to take care of the poor, sick, and under-privileged populations of society.⁶⁹ Specifically, in the Muslim dominated areas of the subcontinent—from the eighth to the eighteenth century—mosques, *madrasas*, and *khanqahs* (Sufi monasteries) were

⁶⁴ International Crisis Group, “Islamic Parties in Pakistan” International Crisis Group, i, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216-islamic-parties-in-pakistan.aspx>, 25.

⁶⁵ Zahid Hussain, “The Construction and Deconstruction of Pakistan: The Institutional Writ of the State,” CIDOB Policy Research Project (June 2014): 10, http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39741/609867/file/JUNE+2014_ZAHID+HUSSAIN.pdf.

⁶⁶ Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” 3.

⁶⁷ Muhammed Asif Iqbal and Saima Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain: The Activities of Faith-Based Organizations in Development in Pakistan,” Religion and Development (RaD) Working Paper 24 (2008): 15, http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1229940021_working_paper_24__web_file.pdf.

⁶⁸ Muhammad Asif Iqbal, Hina Khan, and Surkhab Javed, “Nonprofit Sector in Pakistan: Historical Background,” The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project Pakistan, SPDC Working Paper no. 4 (2004): 5, http://www.adm-cf.com/jhu/pdfs/CNP/CNP_NPS4_Pakistan.pdf.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

established as philanthropic institutions.⁷⁰ Asif Iqbal et al. comment that “the most striking trend in the field of charity and social welfare emerges from a mystical movement within Muslims called Sufism,” which entered the subcontinent from West and Central Asia during the eleventh century.⁷¹ Iqbal and Siddiqui note that the Sufi *khanqahs* provided social services, such as food, for both their inhabitants and the local population, regardless of caste, creed, or race.⁷² ROs therefore have maintained a link with the poor through their social work.

In 1894, the British Raj in the subcontinent tried to limit the work of Islamic charities and brought the *waqf* (religious endowments) under the control of central government.⁷³ Dr. Jennifer Bremer, Director of the Washington Center of the Frank Hawkins Kennan Institute of Private Enterprise, argues that these moves by the British “challenged local elites and reduced their social and economic power relative to that of colonial powers.”⁷⁴ It can be argued that the British colonizers were aware of the social influence of the religious welfare organizations and wanted to limit it, but the local Muslim elites fought against these limitations imposed on their social support base.

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the *waqf* system remained intact, but the first military regime felt threatened by the potential of ROs to use shrines and endowments to mobilize support against military rule. Bremer observes that

⁷⁰ Ibid., 7; Khanqahs are Sufi monasteries where disciples of the *Pirs* (spiritual leaders in Sufism) live and study religion. Khanqahs are similar to *madrasas*, but follow the Sufi doctrine of mystic beliefs.

⁷¹ Ibid., 8–9; Sufism is a mystical movement within Islam that seeks to find divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It consists of a variety of mystical paths that are designed to ascertain the nature of mankind and God and to facilitate the experience of divine love and wisdom in the world. Sufism arose as an organized movement among different groups who found orthodox Islam to be spiritually stifling. The practices of contemporary Sufi orders and suborders vary, but most include the recitation of the name of God or of certain phrases from the Quran as a way to enable the soul to experience the higher reality. Though Sufi practitioners have often been at odds with the mainstream of Islamic theology and law, the importance of Sufism in the history of Islam is incalculable. Sufi literature, especially poetry depicting the love of God, represents a golden age in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu languages. See *Britannica Concise Encyclopedia*, 1839, www.books.google.com/books?isbn=1593394926.

⁷² Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping Terrain,” 16.

⁷³ Jamal Malik, *Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1998), 56.

⁷⁴ Jennifer Bremer “Islamic Philanthropy: Reviving Traditional Forms of Building Social Justice,” paper presented at The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy presented at the annual conference at Washington, DC, May 2004, 14, https://www.csidonline.org/documents/pdf/5th_Annual_Conference-Bremer_paper.pdf.

“Pakistan...entered independence with its Islamic endowment system largely intact.”⁷⁵ After the independence of Pakistan, ROs continued their charity work by delivering social goods to the poor and needy people in society. But during the first military rule (1958–1971), the Sufi shrines and associated *waqf* were placed under the control of the Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs.⁷⁶ Iqbal and Siddiqui argue that:

This may have been a means of controlling any possible threats to the military establishment that could have developed through the congregation of large group of people at the shrines, as these gatherings provided politicians with opportunities to muster support.⁷⁷

Katherine Ewing, a scholar on religious practices in Islam, notes that “leaders of Pakistan have found that the organizational structure of the shrines, traditionally maintained by hereditary living *pirs*, is a force that hampers their efforts to control the political and social organization of the country.”⁷⁸ *Pir* in Sufi tradition is a spiritual leader who is believed to be closer to the God by virtue of his piety. Pir Pagaro in Sind is an example of how influential his followers can be. Pir Pagaro has traditionally had a large following in Sind and its surrounding areas. The followers of Pir Pagaro are called Hurs; they are willing to lay down their lives for him.⁷⁹ The Hurs, under the leadership of Pir Pagaro, staged two rebellions against the British, one in the 1890s and again in the 1940s; during the second rebellion, Sabghatullah Shah was the Pir Pagaro.⁸⁰ The British executed him in 1943 because they saw him as a threat to their administration.⁸¹ It can be argued that the religious leaders such as *pirs* can influence the population through socio-welfare networks of shrines or *kahnqahs* to rally support against the ruling regime. Therefore, ROs have the potential to mobilize masses through their socio-welfare linkage with society.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 18.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Katherine Ewing, “The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 2 (February 1983): 251, doi: 10.2307/2055113.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 256.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

During the military rule of General Zia ul Haq (1977–1988), the ROs increased in numbers and expanded their scope. Iqbal and Siddiqui observe that, “against the backdrop of Zia’s Islamization drive, alongside the Afghan War (1979–1989), and the liberal flow of foreign funds, the ROs flourished.”⁸² This period also saw an increase in sectarian ROs with a military outlook, which can be attributed to the growing influence of Saudi funding to check the spread of Iranian influence after the Iranian Revolution.⁸³ The increase in sectarian competition is also attributed to the phenomenon of the state’s support of the sect of Deobandi.⁸⁴ Zia had a personal inclination toward the hardliner Deobandi ideology, which was not very popular in Pakistan at the time. The majority of the people followed the rather moderate ideology of mystic Sufism, Barelvi.⁸⁵ In 2011, a website on global security estimated that 50 percent of the Muslim population in Pakistan is Barelvi, whereas 20 percent belong to the Deobandi sect.⁸⁶ During the Soviet-Afghan War, military regime under Zia supported the Deobandis and provided them with substantial funds to promote *jihad* in Afghanistan. The funds were used to establish *madrasas*, which changed the sectarian landscape of Pakistan.⁸⁷ The Deobandis, which have been a minority population (20 percent) as compared to the Barelvis (50 percent), have managed to outnumber the *madrasas* run by the latter.⁸⁸ Moreover, Zia also followed the advice of JI and *ulema* from Deobandi ideology in formulating Islamic laws (such as the Hudood Ordinance), of which the minority sects did not approve.⁸⁹

⁸² Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 19.

⁸³ Jon B. Alterman, “Saudi Charities and Support for Terror,” in *Understanding Islamic Charities*, ed. Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2007), 64, <http://books.google.com/books?id=1QbC2rFxr24C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=pakistan&f=false>.

⁸⁴ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: United Book Press, 2008), 151.

⁸⁵ Ismail Khan, “The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 12, no. 56, https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1283/kahn_vol12.pdf.

⁸⁶ Global Security, “Barelvi Islam,” Global Security, last modified on 7 May 2011, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm>.

⁸⁷ Khan, “Assertion of Barelvi Extremism,” 56.

⁸⁸ Ashok K. Behuria, “Sects within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan,” *Strategic Analysis* 32, No.1 (January 2008).

⁸⁹ Hussain Haqqani, “Weeding Out the Heretics: Sectarianism in Pakistan,” 79, http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1352/haqqani_vol4.pdf.

Therefore, through state patronage, a sect that is in minority in terms of population has become more influential. It can be argued that this patronage of a particular sect by the state marginalized the other sects and demonstrated that the religious group that receives the state's patronage would be the beneficiary of state resources and could influence state policies.

It is clear from the previous discussion that ROs in Pakistan have a legacy of carrying out socio-economic services. Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, an architect of the U.S. counterterrorism policy, puts it neatly:

Throughout history, Islamic movements have used social movement organizations, like charities and mosques, which give them critical structures around which to build broadly-based support. Charities can provide critical financial resources as well as logistical support for the society, often filling the void created by weak state structures.⁹⁰

C. CASE OF JI AND JUD

The ROs in Pakistan have become more organized in their welfare activities in the last three decades. ROs such as JI and JUD were among the key relief providers during the devastation caused by the 2005 earthquake and the colossal damage caused by the floods in 2010.⁹¹ This section will look at the welfare work done by these ROs.

1. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)

Jamaat-e-Islami was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawwdudi in 1941 and has a substantial support in terms of street power.⁹² JI claims to have 4.5 million

⁹⁰ Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Terrorism and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East Conference Report," in *Conference Report on Terrorism and Islamic Extremism in the Middle East: Perspectives and Possibilities*, ed. Lashley Pulsipher (Alexandria, VA: 22 February 2005), http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/30502/2005-02_Terrorism_and_Islamic_Extremism_in_the_Middle_East_Perspectives_and_Possibilities.pdf?sequence=1.

⁹¹ Bill Roggio, "USAID Leader in Pakistan Supports Jamaat-ud-Dawa Front," *Long War Journal* (26 August 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/usaid_leader_in_paki.php#; Deutsche Welle, "Pakistani Islamist Groups Very Visible in the Flood-Affected Regions," *DW*, 20 September 2010, <http://www.dw.de/pakistani-islamist-groups-very-visible-in-the-flood-affected-regions/a-6023914>.

⁹² Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, 3.

members.⁹³ Ullah notes that, “currently JI has roughly ten thousand affiliate members in Lahore and fifteen thousand affiliate members in Karachi with a goal of five million affiliates throughout Pakistan.”⁹⁴ He also comments that “the JI’s most important connection to the lower classes and the rural poor comes through its charitable work.”⁹⁵ Christopher Candland argues that the welfare wing of JI, the Al-Khidmat Foundation, “runs approximately 90 madaris [Islamic boarding schools], provides stipends to poor students and funds for the marriage of daughters from poor families, and operates homeopathic clinics, allopathic dispensaries, and a coffin carrying service for families in poor areas.”⁹⁶ Humeira Iqtidar argues that “no...national political party (save JI) has institutional links, however tenuous, with peasants or small farmers.”⁹⁷ A study conducted by RaD shows that JI has an expansive welfare network all over Pakistan (Table 1). Ullah argues that this is “a result of JI’s careful organization and highly motivated membership.”⁹⁸

Table 1. Institutions Run by the Al-Khidmat Foundation.⁹⁹

	Punjab	Sindh		NWFP	Balochistan	Total
		Urban	Rural			
Madrasas	13	97	20	24	18	172
Regular schools	26	12	161	8	1	208
Vocational training centres	11			4		15
Library	1					1
Dispensaries	45				3	48
Clinics	1	21		24		46
Mobile clinics	3			6		9
Hospitals	13	6		1		20
Laboratories	9			15		24
Ambulance services	7			12		19
Medical camps	1	20				21
Blood banks	5					5

⁹³ Christopher Candland, “Faith as Social Capital: Religion and Community Development in Southern Asia,” *Policy Sciences* 33, no. 3/4, Social Capital as a Policy Resource (2000): 362, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532509>.

⁹⁴ Ullah, *Vying for Allah’s Vote*, 84.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 85.

⁹⁶ Candland, “Faith as Social Capital,” 362.

⁹⁷ Humeira Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists? Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Dawa in Urban Pakistan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011): 79.

⁹⁸ Ullah, *Vying for Allah’s Vote*, 85.

⁹⁹ Iqbal and Siddiqui, “Mapping the Terrain,” 30.

Al-Khidmat also works with its sister organizations to provide mainstream education and organize professional associations such as the Ghazali Education Trust with 267 school education 60,000 students, the Rural Education and Development (READ) foundation, which provides education to 60,000 children through 323 schools in rural areas, the Al-Khidmat Khawateen (women) Trust, which provides various social services to women, and the Pakistan Islamic Medical Association (PIMA) with a membership of 3,500 doctors.¹⁰⁰ Candland observes that JI “emphasizes education of young people so as to favorably influence them toward Jamaat-i-Islami thinking.”¹⁰¹ It can therefore be argued that the social work by JI is aimed at expanding their ideology and broadening their support.

Al-Khidmat has also been prominent in providing relief goods and services during times of crisis. Ullah notes that the foundation “was widely praised for its relief efforts following the devastating 2010 floods, when it deployed thousands of relief workers across some of the hardest-hit areas of Pakistan.”¹⁰² As Candland and Qazi state:

It appears that the Jamaat i Islami set up Al Khidmat Foundation with political objectives. The failure of state institutions to respond to the victims of natural disasters and civil strife or lack of government commitment to the educational and health needs of the population allows Al Khidmat, run by accomplished Jamaat i Islami leaders, or to win public sympathy.¹⁰³

According to Al-Khidmat’s website, the foundation runs 163 hospitals and clinics all over the country, which have provided health care to more than 3.5 million people.¹⁰⁴ The foundation claims that the government has been unable to provide basic health care to the poor, but the “Alkhidmat foundation has always served the poorest and neediest

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 31.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote*, 85.

¹⁰³ Christopher Candland and Raza Khan Qazi, *The Cup, the Gun and the Crescent: Social Welfare and Civil Unrest in Muslim Societies*, ed. Sara Ashencaen Crabtree, Jonathan Parker, and Azlinda Azman (New York: Whiting & Birch, 2012), 112.

¹⁰⁴ Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan, official website, <http://al-khidmatfoundation.org/health/#sthash.YvE6oO2C.dpbs>.

segment of Pakistan's society.”¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the website claims to have been quite effective in disaster relief by having provided assistance to a population of 10 million affected people.¹⁰⁶ A senior Pakistani journalist, Shahzada Irfan Ahmed, and a prominent defense analyst, Ayesha Sidiqa note that

The government's inefficiency and lack of capacity to provide relief to all affected areas has allowed for many religious parties to spring into action and exploit the situation by helping victims and thereby gaining their confidence.¹⁰⁷

JI is one such religious organization that fills in the void created by the inability of the government to look after the needs of its population. The expansive network of welfare activities conducted by the welfare wing of JI allows it to increase its influence over society.

2. Jamaat ud Dawa (JUD)

JUD has a widespread welfare network through which it provides education and social welfare to the poor and needy. The organization has been particularly effective in relief work after natural disasters. Within a week after the devastating earthquake of 2005 that killed approximately 73,000 people¹⁰⁸ in the NWFP¹⁰⁹ and Azad Kashmir, JUD had established relief camps and field hospitals equipped with X-ray machines and a makeshift operation theater.¹¹⁰ According to Samaa TV, a Pakistani news channel, “It has

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Shahzada Irfan Ahmed and Ayesha Siddiqa, “Religious Mission or Political Ambition?” *Newsline*, 30 September 2010, <http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2010/09/religious-mission-or-political-ambition/>.

¹⁰⁸ UNICEF, “UNICEF Pakistan Support to Recovery and Rehabilitation of Basic Social Services for the Earthquake-Affected Population 2007–2008,” [www.unicef.org/pakistan/Overview-Updated-September-2007-1_\(2\).pdf](http://www.unicef.org/pakistan/Overview-Updated-September-2007-1_(2).pdf).

¹⁰⁹ The province of NWFP has been renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010, see Samaa TV, “Senate Approved Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Name of NWFP,” Samaa TV, <http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/15-Apr-2010/senate-approved-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-name-of-nwfp>.

¹¹⁰ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Extremists Fill Aid Chasm after Quake,” *Washington Post*, 16 October 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/AR2005101501392.html>.

since built 5,000 homes, 39 schools and 59 mosques there.”¹¹¹ The organization was also effective in carrying out relief work during the refugee crisis, which emerged from both Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations in Swat and the humanitarian disasters after the floods in 2005 and 2010.¹¹² According to Thomas K. Gugler, a German scholar who has written extensively on ROs in Pakistan:

As government agencies in Pakistan cannot organize basic aid for most needy after catastrophes like the earthquake in October 2005 or the flood in July 2010, health services, relief and reconstruction work as well as managing displacement camps is increasingly conducted by Islamist organizations and the JD has become the most prominent militant outfit in Pakistan engaging in humanitarian work.¹¹³

Commenting on the relief work of JUD, the Pakistani interior minister said that the “work of Jamaat and other Islamic groups is ‘the lifeline of our rescue and relief work.’”¹¹⁴ According to Jonathan Benthal, an anthropologist, “hard-line groups proved helpful not only in leveraging the response efforts of the others, but in mobilizing relief work through networks of madrassas and mosques.”¹¹⁵ Benthal notes that during the earthquake relief operations, JUD had supplied medicine to the army and even helped transport NATO soldiers across rivers in remote areas.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ Samaa TV, “Pakistan to Crack Down on Jamaat-ud-Dawa,” Samaa TV, 5 December 2008, <http://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/05-Dec-2008/pakistan-to-crack-down-on-jamaat-ud-dawa>.

¹¹² Rob Crilly, “Pakistan Flood Aid From Islamic Extremists,” *Telegraph*, 21 August 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7957988/Pakistan-flood-aid-from-Islamic-extremists.html>; Declan Walsh, “Banned Jihadi Group is Running Aid Programme for Swat Refugees,” *Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/13/pakistan-aid-terrorism>.

¹¹³ Thomas K. Gugler, “From Kalashnikov to Keyboard: Pakistan’s Jihadscapes and the Transformation of Lashkar-e-Tayba,” in *New Approaches to Analysis of Jihadism Online and Offline*, ed. Rudiger Lohlker (Goettingen, Germany: V&R Unipress GmbH, 2012): 54, <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vyOmLj1DMQEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA37&dq=jamaat+ud+dawa&ots=VD0dYntSh8&sig=mkY3Cd8shJhdflfb4g5G0SHAU64#v=onepage&q=jamaat%20ud%20dawa&f=false>.

¹¹⁴ Declan Walsh, “Extremist Measures,” *Guardian*, 18 October 2005, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/oct/18/pakistan.worlddispatch>.

¹¹⁵ Jonathan Benthal, “Islamic Charities, Faith-Based Organizations, and The International Aid System,” in *Understanding Islamic Charities*, ed. Jon B. Alterman and Karin Von Hippel (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007): 57, <http://books.google.com/books?id=1QbC2rFxr24C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=pakistan&f=false>.

¹¹⁶ Benthal, “Islamic Charities,” 57.

Apart from disaster-relief activities, the organization also runs many social welfare projects all over the country. Aoun Sahi, a Pakistani journalist, states that:

The foundation has its charity operations in almost all parts of the country. They include five hospitals, 126 dispensaries, 152 blood donor societies, 139 ambulances in 73 cities of the country, 140 schools, 40 madrassas and three colleges. More than 60,000 students are enrolled in the educational institutions of the organization.¹¹⁷

JUD also organizes free medical camps in places where the government has not been able to provide health facilities. In February 2013, JUD organized 50 camps in various areas and vaccinated around 22,000 children against measles.¹¹⁸ According to the JUD website, in June 2013, “it has treated more than 20,000 patients over a period of three days through its free medical camps set up in various parts of Baluchistan where they also distributed free medicine.”¹¹⁹ The website also claims that JUD would reach the far-off areas like Tahrparkar in Sindh to provide necessities to the deprived inhabitants of the area.¹²⁰ Such welfare activities enhance the support base for this RO, which not only comes from the people following their ideology, but also from the people of other religions who benefit from their services. This is evident from Humeira Iqtidar’s observation that “Hindus from inner Sindh demonstrated after the JUD was implicated in the Mumbai attack in 2008, protesting that the organization was a charity that helped them by providing food and water, and that any clamping down would have a negative impact.”¹²¹

It is evident from the above discourse that JUD has an effective welfare network that provides the organization with leverage to connect to the poor through filling in the

¹¹⁷ Aoun Sahi, “Dawa, Jihad, Charity or All? News, 15 April 2012, <http://jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2012-weekly/nos-15-04-2012/spr.htm#4>.

¹¹⁸ M. Waqar Bhatti, “Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Other Charities Vaccinating Children against Measles,” News, 15 February 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-160041-Jamaat-ud-Dawa-other-charities-vaccinating-children-against-measles>.

¹¹⁹ Jamat ud Dawa official website, <http://judofficial.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/jamat-ud-dawah-has-treated-more-than-20000-patients-over-a-period-of-three-days-through-its-free-medical-camps-set-up-in-various-parts-of-baluchistan-where-they-also-distributed-free-medicines/>.

¹²⁰ Bhatti, “Jamaat-ud-Dawa.”

¹²¹ Humeira Iqtidar, *Middle East Report*, no. 251, Pakistan under Pressure (Summer 2009): 29–30, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27735298>.

void created by the government's inability to provide social services to the masses. There is no surprise, then, that the JUD's "annual congregation had attracted around one million visitors in 2001, most of them from lower-middle class background."¹²²

D. WHY ROs CONDUCT WELFARE ACTIVITIES

There are two explanations about the motives of ROs to carry out welfare activities: to fulfill a religious obligation of helping the poor or to increase their influence in society by attracting more members. More membership gives them influence over the state's power structure. Helping the poor and the needy is obligatory for Muslims who have the ability to do so. Zakat, an annual subscription of 2.5 percent of accumulated wealth, is the mandatory donation for Muslims of a particular financial stratum. It can be argued that the ROs provide social welfare to meet their religious obligation. There is, however, a powerful benefit from providing social services, which can expand their influence through increase in membership. It can be argued that the poor who benefit from the social services of ROs are prone to support them. Gunther and Diamond argue that:

Religious fundamentalist parties mobilize support not only by invoking religious doctrine and identity, and by proposing policies derived from those principles, but also through selective incentives; they often perform a wide range of social welfare functions which aid in recruiting and solidifying the loyalty of members. This web of organized activities and services encapsulates members within a distinct subculture. Although these are not class-based parties, they disproportionately attract support from the poor and downtrodden and the marginalized middle class, among whom denunciations of injustice and corruption have a particular resonance.¹²³

Similarly, Luca Ozzano, an Italian political scientist, notes that fundamentalist parties can be connected to ROs with a broader appeal in society.¹²⁴ As a consequence of their social services, "they usually find their militants among frustrated and deprived

¹²² Gugler, "From Kalashnikov to Keyboard."

¹²³ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology," *Party Politics* 9, no. 2 (2003): 183, <http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/9/2/167.full.pdf+html>.

¹²⁴ Luca Ozzano, "The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties," *Democratization* 20, no. 5 (2013): 817, doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.801253.

people from middle-lower classes—usually living in rural areas and urban shantytowns—but sometimes also among highly ideologized middle-class people.”¹²⁵ Moreover, Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman observe that:

From Egypt and Palestine to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, radical Islamist groups have enjoyed broad support—especially among the poorer segments of society—because they are major suppliers of mutual aid and social service.¹²⁶

Therefore, it can be argued that the ROs’ social welfare activities help them in expanding their influence over the poor. This increases their influence in society, which allows them to promote their ideology and mobilize segments of society for their objectives, such as demanding concessions or resources from the state.

In Pakistan, where religion has been politicized, the ROs compete to establish a monopoly over religion because the RO that has the most control over religion would be the legitimate beneficiary of the state’s resources. This monopoly and legitimacy will also provide that RO with an influence over state policy.¹²⁷ Collin J. Beck, an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Pomona College, argues that “state incorporation of religion creates religious movements through the construction of Islam as a legitimate mobilizing frame for political action.”¹²⁸ He further comments that “a regime’s maintenance of a public role for Islam also allows increased access to mobilizing resources for religious political organizations, and the creation of a site of mobilization that is sheltered from political exclusion and state repression.”¹²⁹ Candland argues that “in an environment in which religion has been highly politicized, however, it is not surprising that few development organizations have made use of Islamic values to generate cooperation or trust within the communities in which they work.”¹³⁰ It can be argued that where the state

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly,” *Public Choice* 128, no. 1/2, The Political Economy of Terrorism (July 2006): 119.

¹²⁷ Iannaccone, “Voodoo Economics?” 77.

¹²⁸ Colin J. Beck, “State Building as a Source of Islamic Political Organization,” *Sociological Forum* 24, no. 2 (June 2009): 342, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40210404>.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Candland, “Faith as Social Capital,” 363.

uses religion for political purposes, the ROs compete for a monopoly on the religion to acquire more resources. The role of state in politicizing ROs is discussed in Chapter IV of this paper.

E. CONCLUSION

Religious organizations in Pakistan have a history of carrying out social services and helping the poor. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the state sponsored a particular sect, which marginalized other sects. This action had a profound effect on the conduct of ROs, who thus became competitive in expanding their influence on society. The case of JI and JUD are instructive, for in order to increase their influence, the ROs engaged in social services. JI and JUD have expansive welfare networks all over the country. They have been able to provide social and welfare services in the areas where the government has been unable to provide such services. Therefore, these ROs have maintained their link with the poor. Their influence on the poor provides them with the leverage necessary to gain concessions and resources from the state. Therefore, the ROs remain engaged in competitive welfare activities to increase their influence over segments of society belonging to lower and lower-middle classes. It is important to understand the link between religious organizations and the poor to further our understanding of the dependence of the state on religious groups to mobilize the poor. The state has been unable to meet the basic social needs of the poor and therefore, the poor have become disenfranchised by the state and come under the influence of religious organizations. This situation benefits religious organizations, for they can bargain for compensation from the state. By realizing the link between the poor and religious organizations, the state can form policies to address the social requisites of the poor in order to weaken the power base of religious organizations. Some of these ROs have adopted extremist ideologies and because they maintain influence over society through socio-welfare networks, they promote extremism in society. Why these organizations have become extremists in their ideology is discussed in Chapter III.

III. EXTREMISM IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Religious extremism in Pakistan is almost as old as the country itself. Pakistan was formed in 1947 and experienced an initial manifestation of religious extremism in 1953, when *Majlis e Ahrar*—a religious organization—demanded the state to declare *Ahmedis* as *kafirs* (non-Muslims).¹³¹ Pending action on their demand, *Ahrar* resorted to violent protests and riots in Punjab; they also incited killings of *Ahmedis*, including the brutal murder of an army officer.¹³² Incidents of such extremism through religious symbols have since become commonplace in Pakistan; however, it was not until the late 1970s that the violence started increasing to an alarming level.¹³³ This increase in violence was a manifestation of the extremist ideology propagated by some of the ROs. The adoption of extremist ideologies by some of the ROs is mostly related to the rise of sectarian strife during late 1970s after the Iranian Revolution and during the Afghan War.¹³⁴ Since then, some of these religious organizations have been engaged in promoting the polarization of society along sectarian lines, which has led to increased violence and acts of terrorism.¹³⁵ Nasr argues that sectarianism in Pakistan can be contextualized as “militant religio-political activism, whose specific aim is to safeguard and promote the socio-political interests of the particular Muslim sectarian

¹³¹ *Ahmedis* belong to a heretic sect founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, who declared that “Jesus of Nazareth had not died on the Cross, nor lifted up to the Heavens but that he was taken off the Cross in a wounded condition by his disciples and cured of his wounds, that thereafter he escaped to Kashmir where he died a natural death himself.” Later he proclaimed himself to be the promised Messiah. See, “Report of the Court of Inquiry: Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” 9–10, http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf.

¹³² “Report of the Court of Inquiry: Punjab Disturbances of 1953,” 13, www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf.

¹³³ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (February 2000): 139, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/313114?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

¹³⁴ Ali Riaz, “Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan,” Working Paper No. 85, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore (August 2005).

¹³⁵ Isaac Kfir, “Sectarian Violence and Social Group Identity in Pakistan,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 6 (May 2014), 458, <http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2014.903374>.

community.”¹³⁶ He further comments that the goals of this kind of activism are achieved through both the mobilization of the sectarian identity in question and the marginalization of the rival sectarian community, largely through prolific use of violence.¹³⁷ Therefore, it can be argued that some of the ROs in Pakistan have been using violence to promote the socio-political interests of a particular Muslim community.

Pakistan is home to some of the most diverse sectarian groups. The two main sects are Sunni and Shia; however, there are further subsects within these sects, which are equally exclusive and hold extreme views about each other. The graph in Figure 2 depicts major sects and subsects in Pakistan:¹³⁸




Figure 2. Major Sects and Subsects in Pakistan.

Several sectarian groups in Pakistan promote extremism by using *jihadist* ideology to motivate their followers to kill people of other sects in the name of God. According to them, other sects are heretics that undermine Islam. This kind of idea, based on selective selections from Quran and Islamic teachings, contributes to religious extremism. The concept of *Jihad* in Islam entails a much broader perspective of struggle,

¹³⁶ Vali R. Nasr, “International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998,” *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 2 (January 2000):171, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422396>.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ For more on various sects in Pakistan, see Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua, “The New Frontiers: Militancy & Radicalism in Pakistan,” Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Report no. 2 (2013).

whereas some of the ROs in Pakistan have reduced the concept of *jihad* as militarized struggle for vested interests. Promoting this kind of *jihadist* ideology as militarized struggle through specific verses from the Quran induces extremism in society, which then becomes supportive of militant groups. Christine Fair et al. observe that those who believe that “jihad is a militarized struggle are 2.3–2.7 percent more supportive of policies endorsed by militant groups.”¹³⁹ Some ROs help in broadening support for militant groups by promoting a reductionist *jihadist* ideology, which thus contributes to extremism in society.

Most scholarly research has remained focused on only one aspect of religious organizations—*madrasas*—whereas the extremist religious organizations have been understudied. This chapter will show that extremist religious organizations provide a “supporting environment” to terrorists by promoting extremist ideologies in a competitive setting for followers.¹⁴⁰ Emma Hooper notes that, “it is the failure to address extremism, militant, and sectarian violence that has led to a vicious cycle of creeping radicalism, to a deeply disturbing extent.”¹⁴¹ Therefore, there is a need to broaden our understanding of the extremist ROs in Pakistan, which have become breeding grounds for terrorism.¹⁴²

This chapter will demonstrate that the ROs in Pakistan have become more extreme because they want to maximize their leverage over the population by using religious symbols to gain power and money. The ROs operate in a competitive market of sectarian ideologies to maximize their supporters who in turn provide them with power and money. For these goals, they have adopted extreme ideologies, which are based on the exclusion of “others” to monopolize their position on religious matters. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section illustrates a link between religious organizations and extremism. The second section discusses the religious organizations in

¹³⁹ Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine?”

¹⁴⁰ Waldmann, “Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures,” 255.

¹⁴¹ Emma Hooper, “Pakistan: Back to the Future?” *Notes International CIDOB* 91 (June 2014), http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/39500/608345/file/NOTES+91_HOOPER_ANG%282%29.pdf.

¹⁴² Peter Warren Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,” Brookings Institution (November 2001), <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/11/pakistan-singer>.

Pakistan with a theoretical approach of rational choice to demonstrate that these organizations compete amongst each other for resources. The last section explores how the religious organizations also use *madrasas* to promote militant extremism to achieve their objectives.

A. LINK BETWEEN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTREMISM

Martha Crenshaw is a scholar of social sciences at Stanford University who has conducted extensive research on terrorism and its causes. She argues that, “in some cases, the terrorist organization may be, in effect, a subunit of a legal organization with a large public membership.”¹⁴³ She refers to such terrorist organizations as “extremist offshoots of broader social movements or political parties,” which “represent communal or ethnic constituency.”¹⁴⁴ Therefore, Crenshaw draws a link between some political parties and terrorist organizations. Christine Fair observes that there are some religious political parties in Pakistan that support terrorist organizations.¹⁴⁵ These political parties are: Deobandi tanzeems that include Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin; Ahl-e-Hadith organizations, which include militant wings like Lashkar-e-Taiba (now called JUD); and Jamaat-e-Islami, which is connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and supports Al Badr and Hizbul Mujahidin.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, Howenstein also points out that the *jihadi* organizations in Pakistan mainly operate under the aegis of these three religious organizations: Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴⁷ These organizations are discussed in the next section. These ROs use religious symbols and extremist ideology to mobilize the population in support of militant struggle.

In a competitive environment where religious differences exist, each ideology can provide distinct venues to mobilize support against the system. The disenfranchised

¹⁴³ Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” *Forum* 6 (Fall 1985): 467.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Christine Fair “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 1, 49–65, doi: 10.1080/09546550701733996, 49.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 49.

¹⁴⁷ Nicholas Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Research Report 1 (February 2008).

population can be seen as a potential support for the ROs, who fight among each other to include this population in their membership to increase their own support base. In other words, no religion inherently promotes terrorism, but it can be argued that some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to attract the parts of the population that are dissatisfied with the existing system, a process that results in terrorist activities. The ROs organize dissatisfaction among the masses to pursue their vested interests. In doing so, they propagate extremist ideologies to radicalize their supporters, who thus develop an affinity for terrorism as means to achieve their objectives. We see this happening in Pakistan where extremist ROs contribute to terrorism. The following section illustrates how some ROs in Pakistan are linked to terrorist groups.

B. EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN

Sunni and Shia are the two main sects of Islam; however, there are further subsects among Sunnis. The broad subsects of Sunnis in Pakistan are: Barelvis; Deobandis; Ahl-e-Hadith; and revivalists such as JI.¹⁴⁸ Historically, sects and subsects hold extremist views against each other. Some of them promote the killing of the others because they believe that the other sects are following and promoting distorted beliefs, which is punishable by death. A study conducted by the Pew Research Center finds Pakistan among the top ten countries with very high social hostilities involving religion.¹⁴⁹ Set in such a competitive ideological milieu, the religious organizations strive for monopoly over religion because the group that has the monopoly would be the legitimate representative of religion in the country. This will provide that group with the authority and legitimacy to influence the state to enforce Sharia laws as interpreted by that sect, thereby providing that RO with the leverage to gain access to power and money.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Brian J. Grim, “Rising Restrictions on Religion: One-third of the World’s Population Experiences an Increase,” Pew Research Center (August 2011): 16–17, <http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Government/RisingRestrictions-web.pdf>.

1. Rise of Religious Extremism in Pakistan

Before Pakistani Independence, Islamic religious organizations in the sub-continent—most prominently Jamiat-Ulamai-Hind (JUH) and JI—had opposed the idea of a separate state for Muslims. They had opposed creation of Pakistan because they “condemned the Muslim League leaders, especially Jinnah, for their ignorance of the fundamentals of Islam.”¹⁵⁰ Soon after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, the religious organizations suddenly abandoned their opposition of the state for an opportunity to establish an Islamic state through enforcement of Sharia Law. This was in contrast to the rather secular idea of Pakistan envisioned by Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of the new state and the man regarded as *Quaid-e-Azam* (the great leader).¹⁵¹ Therefore, a competition between the secular and religious identity of the state started with the formation of the state. At the time of Independence, JI and JUI were the two prominent religious organizations in Pakistan. JI was founded by Mawlana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawwdudi in 1941; JUI was essentially a group of Deobandi Ulema, which split from JUH in 1945.¹⁵² Other religious groups included Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), which was formed in 1950 by Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani who was initially part of Muslim League (ML), but later created his own party.¹⁵³ Moreover, various *pirs*—individuals from Barelvi sect with large personal followings believing in mystic Sufism—were also influential in the religious and political spheres. Despite these religious organizations’ prevalence since the Independence, Pakistan did not see much religious terrorism until the end of Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s. A report by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre notes that up to 4000 people have died in sectarian violence between the mid-1980s and early 2000s.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, between 2007 and 2011, there was a sharp increase in sectarian terrorism that claimed the lives of 1,649

¹⁵⁰ Rizwan Hussain, “Pakistan,” in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0616>.

¹⁵¹ Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote*, 61.

¹⁵² Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, 3.

¹⁵³ Global Security, “Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan,” Global Security.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/jup.htm>.

¹⁵⁴ Yusuf, “Sectarian Violence: Pakistan’s Greatest Security Threat,” 3.

people.¹⁵⁵ The rise in sectarian terrorism can be connected to the emergence of various extremist sectarian organizations that are linked to the ROs mentioned above. The following are some selected ones that have connections with some ROs:¹⁵⁶

a. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

TTP is a coalition of FATA based militants who aim to overthrow the Pakistani state and enforce the Sharia law of their interpretation. This group uses various terrorist tactics, including use of suicide bombings, against security and civilian targets since 2007. In recent years, it has provided all kinds of support to militants involved with Deobandi sectarian organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat.

b. Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)

The ASWJ is the new name of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The SSP is an extremist Sunni (Deobandi) militant organization that has carried out attacks against Shias, whom it believes to be infidels, since 1985. In recent years the SSP has also targeted Barelvi groups. This group has also developed strong ties with the TTP. The Pakistan government banned the SSP in March 2012 after the rise in sectarian violence.

c. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ, an offshoot of SSP, was established in the 1980s. This is an extremist Sunni organization with close links to TTP. LeJ is responsible for sectarian warfare in Karachi and attacks against the Shia Hazaras of Baluchistan. This group is also accused of assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007.

d. Sipah-e-Mohamadi Pakistan (SMP)

SMP was founded in 1993 to protect the Shia community from extremist Sunni militant groups. In 2008–2009, the group resurfaced in the urban centers of Karachi and

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 4–5; Dawn News, “Pakistan Bans 25 Militant Organizations,” *Dawn*, 6 August 2009, <http://www.dawn.com/news/963704/pakistan-bans-25-militant-organisations>.

Lahore. SMP has been recently accused of killing prominent Sunni doctors. Allegedly, the group receives support and funding from Iran. Four SMP militants were arrested in 2011 for involvement in a grenade attack against the Saudi Arabian consulate in Karachi.

e. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD)

LeT was founded in the late 1980s by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed with primary aim to aid the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets. After the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, this group shifted its focus to *Jihad* in Kashmir. The LeT was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002. Consequently, Hafiz Saeed established a charitable foundation named JUD; however, it is generally believed that JUD is the new face of LeT, although Saeed denies any links with LeT. LeT/JUD follows the Ahle Hadith ideology, which is in sync with the Salafist ideology popular in Saudi Arabia.

f. Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP)

TJP is an offshoot of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafria, a Shia political party founded in 1979. The TJP has been banned twice, but continues to operate under different names. Its members claim that the organization is essentially a Shia resistance to Sunni extremism, but TJP has also been involved in sectarian violence.

g. Sunni Tehrik (ST)

ST is a Barelvi militant organization, established in 1982 by Ilyas Qadri. This group is believed to be a retaliatory militant wing against sectarian attacks by the ASWJ. ST is accused of engaging in turf wars to gain control of the mosques of rival sects through land acquisition.

h. Jandullah

Jandullah is an anti-Shia militant group, which mostly operates in Baluchistan but has ties with LeJ, ASWJ, and TTP. Its militants were accused of killing 40 Shias in a bomb blast at Karachi in 2009. Jandullah has also been involved in attacks against state's security forces.

2. Alliance between the State and ROs

In the past, the Pakistani state has made considerable concessions to some ROs to gain popular support and to secure its security interests. In return, the ROs have been rewarded by the state with money and leeway to increase their followership. These allowances to ROs by the state were made for political support and security concerns.¹⁵⁷ The role of state in relation to ROs is discussed in Chapter IV. Similar concessions to ROs were made by the state during the Soviet-Afghan War to mobilize support for the war.¹⁵⁸ In return, the state provided substantial financial support to the “Sunni fundamentalists” who had provided assistance to the state during the war, such as JI and JUD, which remained the principle beneficiaries of the state’s support.¹⁵⁹ This patronage from the state made these ROs stronger and they expanded their sphere of influence all over the country through the expansion of their *madrasas*. The expansion of some ROs through these resources provided by the state made other religious groups wary of the former’s increasing influence. The increased power of some ROs thus created a “security dilemma”¹⁶⁰ whereby the marginalized ROs felt threatened by the influence of state supported ROs. The support provided to some ROs by the state has led to a competitive environment among ROs that use extremist ideology to increase their membership, thus becoming eligible for resources provided by the state.

Kfir states that “sectarian groups are quintessentially social groups albeit of a religious nature;” furthermore, these social groups attract individuals through common identity.¹⁶¹ ROs therefore use religious identity to attract members of the population to join them. Individuals who join an RO become eligible to receive benefits from that RO; “those not part of the group do not receive support and protection from the group,” writes

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 188.

¹⁵⁸ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Military and the Wars Within* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 373–374.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 374; Ullah, *Vying For Allah’s Vote*, 144.

¹⁶⁰ The term “security dilemma” is borrowed from International Relations Theory as applied to ethnic conflicts. See Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 530–532, <http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1017/S0260210510000616>.

¹⁶¹ Kfir, “Sectarian Violence,” 458–459.

Kfir.¹⁶² He argues that the challenge for these religious social groups is that they have to prove to their group members that they can “extract concessions from established political actors, who will only offer concessions as part of a bargaining process with those that pose a threat to them and the state.”¹⁶³ It can be argued that too many religious groups in Pakistan are trying to prove that they can gain concessions from the state. This competition for resources and support from the state can turn violent. In Pakistan, various ROs have turned violent against each other and against state institutions and civilian population to demonstrate their power and influence. This demonstration of violence is meant to attract the state’s attention and make the state believe that they are influential factors that the state needs to consider in the distribution of resources.

3. Religious Extremism as a Rational Behavior

Iannaccone and Berman suggest that religious extremism should be viewed as rational behavior. They argue that, “*religious producers* maximize membership, net resources, government support, or some other basic determinant of institutional wellbeing.”¹⁶⁴ Moreover, they comment that, “the efficiency of sectarian groups at politics and organized violence creates the potential for a sect to capture the benefits of political monopoly and then violently repress both political and religious opposition.”¹⁶⁵ They conclude that the countries where civil government favors a particular form of religious expression are more prone to violent sects because the disfavored sects will be “strongly motivated to oppose the government despise the established religion, and covet the privileges that come with state support.”¹⁶⁶

Kent D. Miller, in developing a strategic management theory of ROs, argues that “religious organizations depend on access to resources from the external

¹⁶² Ibid., 459.

¹⁶³ Kfir, “Sectarian Violence,” 459.

¹⁶⁴ Laurence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and the Deadly,” *Public Choice* 128(1/2) (2006): 109–129, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30026636?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 123.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 126.

environment.”¹⁶⁷ He further elaborates that the resources are not limited to physical and financial assets, but also include “the number of adherents and their levels of time, commitment, and effort.”¹⁶⁸ Therefore, it can be argued that the ROs endeavor to increase their membership and get access to material resources. The competitive environment—such as the one in Pakistan—where too many ROs are fighting to maximize their membership and seeking material benefits, the competition leads to violent acts. Such violence by a particular RO is meant to demonstrate to the state that it needs to acknowledge the strength of the RO and must meet its demands. Violence assures its followers that the RO will protect the interests of its members at any cost.

C. THE USE OF MADRASAS

The extremist ROs in Pakistan use *madrasas* to increase their membership. In doing so, the extremist ROs teach their extremist ideologies to the students who mostly take up religious positions in society after graduation from the *madrasas*. The link between *madrasas* and terrorism has been denied by some scholars on the basis of empirical research. This section will demonstrate that such empirical research has serious limitations, which does not mean that this connection should not be analyzed carefully when informing policy.

Madrasas have existed in Muslim societies for centuries. One of the first *madrasas*, called *Nizamiyah*, was established in Baghdad in the eleventh century A.D.¹⁶⁹ After that, it spread to other regions that came under the rule of Muslims. Christopher M. Blanchard observes that though “their curricula varied from place to place, it was always religious in character because these schools ultimately were intended to prepare future Islamic religious scholars (*ulama*) for their work.”¹⁷⁰ These *madrasas* not only delivered religious education, but also provided free room and board for the students.¹⁷¹ Riaz notes

¹⁶⁷ Kent D. Miller, “Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations,” *Strategic Management Journal* 23, no. 5 (May 2002): 438, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094476?origin=JSTOR-pdf>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 438–439.

¹⁶⁹ Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background.”

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

that the network of *madrasas* became institutionalized in 1959 under the aegis of four ideological schools: Ahl-e-Hadith formed Wafaq-al-Madaris-al-Salafia; Deobandis created Wafaq al-Madaris al-Arabai; Brelvis set up Tanzim-al-Madaris Arabai; and the Shias were grouped under the Majlis-e-Nazarat-e shiah Madaris-e-Arabbiah (currently known as Wafaq-al-Madaris (Shia) Pakistan).¹⁷² Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak and Jamia Binoria Town at Karachi were the earliest of established *madrasas*, which belonged to Deobandi ideology.¹⁷³ The number of these Deobandi *madrasas* increased over the time and it is believed that since the 1980s, Pakistan has experienced an exponential growth in the number of *madrasas*.

During this time, the curricula of *madrasas* became more radicalized by the ROs that ran them. Ahmed states that “a study conducted by Patrick Belton shows how textbooks developed at the University of Nebraska-Omaha and published by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were used to encourage and justify the ‘holy war’ against the Soviets.”¹⁷⁴ Nasr, on the other hand, argues that the radicalization of *madrasas* started in mid-1970s as a consequence of the proliferation of *madrasas* belonging to Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i Hadith schools of Sunni Islam.¹⁷⁵

At the same time, under the leadership of Abul Ala Mowdudi, JI started its venture in politics.¹⁷⁶ Riaz argues that the political situation of Pakistan in 1977 “created opportunities for the marginalized ulemas (religious clerics) to return to the limelight through the political parties.”¹⁷⁷ The Deobandi political party—JUD—and the revivalists—JI—used *madrasas* under their influence to provide foot soldiers for street agitation.¹⁷⁸ Thus, the *madrasas* became instruments of these religious organizations to

¹⁷² Riaz, “Global Jihad,” 14.

¹⁷³ Zainab Shahab Ahmed, “Madrasa Education in the Pakistani Context: Challenges, Reforms and Future Directions,” *South Asian Journal of Peace Building* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 2009): 2.

¹⁷⁴ Ahmed, “Madrasa Education in the Pakistani Context,” 3.

¹⁷⁵ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (February 2000): 139, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/313114>.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 15.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

achieve their religious and political objectives. During the same time, Pakistan and the U.S. got involved in the Soviet-Afghan War and co-opted various ROs to mobilize their *madrasa* students as *mujahideen* to fight against the Soviet “infidels” in Afghanistan. The leaders of these ROs competed for the resources being provided by the government. Riaz states that:

The Government-controlled Zakat Fund and U.S. money was the prize they (leaders of ROs) went after, but to increase their shares of the pie they had to marginalize their opponents ideologically, dwarf them numerically, and if necessary, annihilate them physically. All of these required foot soldiers and the madrassahs became the recruiting centre with these objectives in view.¹⁷⁹

Therefore, it can be argued that because the ROs compete for resources, they promote extreme ideologies that lead to violence and acts of terrorism. Such ideologies are stimulated in *madrasas*, but some scholars have opposed the idea that *madrasas* promote extremism and terrorism. Mark Sageman, Peter Bergen, and Alan Krueger find that most of the terrorists are educated in non-*madrasa* institutions.¹⁸⁰ Their research is based mostly on the data related to international terrorism that directly affects the West. Therefore, they ignore the link between *madrasas* and extremist terrorism in Pakistan, which is a serious security challenge not only for Pakistan, but also for the larger spheres of regional and international security. Christine Fair, who has worked extensively on Islamic education in Pakistan, argues that:

Prior to concluding that *madaris* are irrelevant to militant recruitment in the region or otherwise unimportant, there is strong evidence that many—but by no means all—of Pakistan’s suicide attackers and sectarian militants do come from *madaris*.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Riaz, “Global Jihad,” 17.

¹⁸⁰ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers,” *New Republic* (June 2002); Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassah Scapegoat,” *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 117–125.

¹⁸¹ Christine Fair, “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 1 (2008): 58, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550701733996>.

Moreover, in a study conducted by Fair in Afghanistan in 2007, she states that, “the preponderance of suicide attackers in Afghanistan who come from Pakistan appears to be recruited from *madaris* in Pakistan’s tribal belt.”¹⁸²

The role of *madrasas* as a breeding ground for extremism is thus evident from above discussion. The extremist ROs, which run these *madrasas*, use them to mobilize their students and teachers to demonstrate their power against rival factions. They also use their students to fight wars and become militants because such activities provide the extremist ROs with economic benefits from the state.

D. CONCLUSION

Islam as a religion does not promote violence;¹⁸³ however, this chapter shows that some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to promote extremism. ROs in Pakistan have existed since the creation of the country. Yet during the mid-1970s, there was an exponential rise in creation of new ROs on the basis of sectarianism. This increase in the number of sectarian ROs, coupled with the funding of some ROs from foreign countries and the Pakistani government, is related to the increase in violence and terrorism within the country. Such a relationship suggests that the ROs in Pakistan operate in a competitive environment where each RO strives to claim monopoly over religion. The ROs can be seen as rational actors, which want to maximize their benefits in terms of demanding resources from the state, increase their membership, and marginalize their competitors. To maximize their benefits, some ROs resort to extreme measures, including the use of violence and the promotion of extremism in society. *Madrasas* provide foot soldiers to the extremist ROs, which carry out acts of violence to prove that they are a significant factor and that the state must respond to their demands. Understanding these ROs in the context of rational actors, which are trying to compete in a market of ideologies, is therefore necessary to comprehend why and how these ROs promote extremism in the society. This understanding is important in formulating policies to counter extremism in Pakistan. The role of the state in favoring one sect can exacerbate

¹⁸² Ibid., 62.

¹⁸³ Sultan M. Hali, “No Place for Extremism & Religious Intolerance in Islam,” *Criterion* 6, no. 2 (April 2011): 121–154, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/918709657?accountid=12702>.

the situation because the other sects feel marginalized and disenfranchised. They also feel threatened by the growing influence of the favored sect and thus take up violent measures to protect their interests and seek resources from the state. The support for these ROs comes from people who are dissatisfied with the existing system. Therefore, the effectiveness of the state in providing social and economic support to its people can limit the membership of these extremist ROs. The role of state in relation to the extremist ROs is discussed in Chapter IV.

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IV. THE ROLE OF STATE IN RELATION TO ROS

Once religion occupies center stage, it is indeed difficult to sideline those who profess to be the guardians of the faith.

—Gilles Boquerat and Nazir Hussain

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will look at the relations between the state and ROs and will illustrate that the Pakistani state has needed ROs to mobilize support from the society from 1947 when it became independent. Since ROs have the power to garner street support through their social organizing, they have been able to bargain with the state, which has needed their support for political reasons. This chapter will use five examples to illustrate use of ROs by the state since 1947: the use of religious identity to mobilize population during creation of Pakistan; accepting the demands of ROs during the formative years of the country; the Islamic character of 1973 Constitution and passing of legislation in 1974 to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims; use of ROs by General Zia-ul-Haq to legitimize his military rule and fight a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1980s, as well as implementing Sharia Law through Hudood Ordinance in 1979; and use of ROs to legitimize the rule under General Pervez Musharraf in 2002. This chapter will illustrate that the state's dependence on ROs for political needs has led to the expansion of extremist policies by the state, which contribute to overall toleration of extremism in the country. Such policies exclude minority religions and sects; therefore, these groups feel marginalized and resort to violence in order to protect their rights.

B. USE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND ROs FOR POLITICAL PURPOSE

1. Pre-independence Era: 1937–1947

Religion has played a prominent role in the Pakistan Movement, which was led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his party All India Muslim League (AIML). During the struggle for independence from the British, leaders of AIML had used religious identity to mobilize population. During the famous Lahore session of Muslim League in March

1940, Muhammad Ali Jinnah stated, “The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures.”¹⁸⁴ Therefore, according to Jinnah there was a need to create a separate homeland for the Muslims in the shape of Pakistan.

A careful analysis of the Pakistan movement and the leaders associated with it reveals that religious identity was used by the leaders of AIML for political reasons. Christophe Jaffrelot, a French political scientist specializing in South Asia, notes:

Jinnah and most of his lieutenants were not religious, but they used Islam as a focus for an evocation of nationalism, playing on its emotional power to gain the attention of the Muslim in the streets. Thus, Islam became a *lingua franca* which allowed the establishment of a front combining the Muslims in ‘minority’ situations with those in Punjab. In the 1946 elections, the League won a majority in the province with 75 seats compared with just ten for the Unionists.¹⁸⁵

Similarly, Leonard Binder, a distinguished professor of political science, notes that “after the elections of 1936, even the greater efforts were made to win over the ‘ulemā’, this time on the Pakistan platform and the slogan of an Islamic state.”¹⁸⁶ Jinnah needed support from ulema to strengthen his political position; therefore, he managed to secure backing from JUH, an organization of Indian religious scholars.¹⁸⁷ JUH provided Jinnah with requisite support against JI, which had been portraying him as secular and un-Islamic.¹⁸⁸ Against the opposition from JI, Jinnah therefore needed support from religious scholars to strengthen his political position as a leader of the Muslims. It is therefore clear that during the Pakistan movement, religious identity had been used by the leaders to garner support for political reasons.

¹⁸⁴ Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism without A Nation* (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 2004), 12.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 14.

¹⁸⁶ Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 29.

¹⁸⁷ Farhan Mujahid Chak, *Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture* (New York, Routledge, 2014), 107.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

2. Formative Years of Pakistan

After the creation of Pakistan, the subsequent governments and political parties have been using religious identity to amass public support. Using religious symbols and support from the ROs provide them legitimacy to be the representatives of a predominantly Muslim population. During the formative years of Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the new face of AIML after the independence of Pakistan, was the major representative political party. The central leaders of AIML came from Muslim minority provinces. Khalid Bin Sayeed, a renowned Pakistani political scientist notes in his book, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948*: “There was a feeling of uneasiness, sometimes bordering on resentment among the leaders of the Muslim majority provinces that the AIML was dominated by leaders from the Muslim minority provinces.”¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the PML leadership lacked a popular base in the Muslim majority provinces.¹⁹⁰ The PML leaders had to compete with the local leaders that joined PML a decade before independence; these local leaders were significant contenders of power having strongholds in provinces in the new country.¹⁹¹ Dr. Kausar Parveen, a lecturer at Punjab University Lahore, argues that, “being insecure and apprehensive, the PML leadership relied on the name of Islam to save them and to unite the nation in the face of gigantic problems.”¹⁹² Lack of political base for the leaders of PML in the newly created country therefore, compelled the leaders to use religious symbols to gather support against potential contenders of power.

The PML, in an attempt to consolidate power and bring unity among the diverse ethnic population of the newly formed country, used Islamic identity as a gelling agent. In doing so, they had to win over ROs for their support. This was achieved by acquiescing to the demand of ROs to declare Pakistan an Islamic state and make all laws

¹⁸⁹ Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948*, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 206.

¹⁹⁰ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: Hounds mills, St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 4.

¹⁹¹ Kausar Parveen, “The Role of Opposition in Constitution-Making: Debate on the Objectives Resolution,” 144–145.

¹⁹² Ibid., 145.

in accordance with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. The Objectives Resolution of 1949 was the first manifestation of state's appeasement of the ROs.¹⁹³ The demand for making Pakistan an Islamic state came from the Ulema in the Government (i.e., Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the President of the JUI, Pir of Manki Sharif in the NWFP, Maulana Akram Khan, the President of the East Pakistan Provincial Muslim League, and outside the government, JI.¹⁹⁴ The First Constituent Assembly, despite opposition by the minorities represented by the Pakistan National Congress (PNC), accepted the demands of ROs in the shape of the Objectives Resolution, which was approved in March 1949.¹⁹⁵ Tasneem Kausar, a scholar of constitutional law and political science, claims that, "in retrospect, it can be argued that this document was the outcome of intense pressurizing by the Ulema who started mobilizing the public to hold the government accountable for backing off from its commitment to 'make Pakistan a fortress of Islam.'"¹⁹⁶ The political leaders accepted the demands of ROs to make Pakistan an Islamic state; this was done to rally the support from ROs, which had the ability to mobilize population.

The provisions of Objectives Resolution, as predicted by the minority party, PNC had the potential to marginalize the minorities and contribute toward extremism in the society. As pointed out by Bhupendra Kumar Datta, a PNC member at the time, "the religious clauses of Objectives Resolution would condemn the minorities 'forever to an inferior status.'"¹⁹⁷ He further argued that "without a legitimate right to share power, the minorities would taste neither democracy, nor freedom, nor equality, nor social justice; they would merely be tolerated."¹⁹⁸ Dr. Kausar argues that "this not only resulted in the

¹⁹³ The Objectives Resolution of 1949 provided the basic guidelines for formulating the constitution of the newly created state of Pakistan. Objectives Resolution demanded that all laws of the country must be made in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The 1973 constitution was formulated under these broad guidelines, but it explicitly included clauses related to Islamic character of the state and declared that Sharia laws were to be implemented in the country. The Hudood Ordinance of 1983 implemented Sharia law as interpreted by the Sunni Sect. See James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Pakistan* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009): 171, 207, 216.

¹⁹⁴ Parveen, "The Role of Opposition in Constitution-Making," 143.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.; also see Nasr, *Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*,

¹⁹⁶ Tasneem Kausar, "Religion, Politics and the Dilemma of National Identity" in *Islam, Law and Identity*, ed. Marinos Diamantides and Adam Gearey (New York: Routledge, 2012), 195.

¹⁹⁷ Parveen, "The Role of Opposition in Constitution-Making," 151.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

increasing insecurities and anxieties of the minorities but inflamed the sectarian differences within the Muslim community itself.”¹⁹⁹ It can therefore be argued that by ceding to the demands of ROs, to include exclusionary clauses that marginalized minorities, the government inadvertently paved the way for exclusionary politics based on religious identity.

3. The Constitution of 1973

The Constitution of 1973 was the first constitution passed by an elected body. Previously, the 1956 Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, which was not an elected body; the 1962 Constitution was passed by the Constitution Committee appointed by the military ruler, General Ayub Khan. Therefore, the first-ever democratic parliament crafted the 1973 Constitution, which declared Pakistan as an Islamic republic. Part IX, Article 227 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.²⁰⁰ The religious clauses included in the constitution have since made religion a politically potent force. This has allowed the political leaders in Pakistan to use religion for political legitimacy and national integration.²⁰¹ Dr. Arshi Hashmi, a Pakistani expert on religious radicalism and militancy, argues that “political use of religion has heightened religious antagonism and acrimony, besides creating space for religious militancy and extremism.”²⁰²

To understand the Islamic character of 1973 Constitution, passed by a left-leaning Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), it may be useful to review political environment of the time. In 1970, the first-ever general elections were held in Pakistan in which PPP, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was pitched against PML and JI; “the two leading political parties

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 157.

²⁰⁰ Arshi Saleem Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi (2009), 5, https://www.academia.edu/392212/Pakistan_Politics_Religion_and_Extremism.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

emphasizing religious identity and agendas.”²⁰³ In the elections, Bhutto’s PPP won 81 of the 138 seats in West Pakistan, but lost in East Pakistan where Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman’s Awami League won 160 of 162 seats.²⁰⁴ The subsequent power struggle between Bhutto and Mujib led to the secession of East Pakistan in December 1971. The separation of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in December 1971, came also with an embarrassing surrender of 90,000 military troops stationed at Bangladesh. Bhutto, however, had become the new prime minister of Pakistan, and he had to face tremendous opposition especially from ROs that used secession of East Pakistan to mobilize masses against him. They claimed that because of Bhutto’s wrong policies, Pakistan had lost its eastern wing, which was a blow to the two nation theory.²⁰⁵ The ROs at the time advocated that the only way to save rest of the country was to use Islam as the gelling agent. Bhutto, who had started his political career as a socialist, also started using religious symbols to gain legitimacy amid growing opposition from religious parties.²⁰⁶ Riaz Hussain observes that “Bhutto used emotive religious phrases like *Musawat-i-Muhammad* (the equality of Muhammad) and *Islami Musawat* (Islamic equality) as part of his political rhetoric to justify and win mass support for the socialist policies of his government.” He further argues that “as anti-government agitation led by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)—whose leaders used Islam to mobilize people against Bhutto’s government—flared up in the main urban centers the government sought to defuse the situation by announcing ‘Islamic’ reforms.”²⁰⁷ Asghar Ali Engineer, an Islamic scholar from India, notes that, “though Bhutto was a modernist, he used religion to appease the bigoted religious leadership of Pakistan to buy time and to stabilize his regime.”²⁰⁸

²⁰³ Kausar, “Religion, Politics and the Dilemma of National Identity,” 196.

²⁰⁴ Craig Baxter, “Pakistan Votes 1970,” *Asian Survey* 11, no. 3 (March 1971): 211.

²⁰⁵ Anwar H. Syed, *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 91.

²⁰⁶ Rubya Mehdi, *The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan*, 2nd ed. (London: Curzen Press, 2013), 96.

²⁰⁷ Riaz Hussain, “Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no. 3 (July 1985), 263.

²⁰⁸ Asghar Ali Engineer, “Pakistan: Religion, Politics, and Society,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 31, no. 41/42 (12–19 October 1996), <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/10.2307/4404680.pdf?acceptTC=true>.

Thus, Bhutto and his government made considerable concession to the ROs's demands to include religious clauses in the constitution.

4. 1974 Constitutional Amendment Declaring Ahmedis as Non-Muslims

By 1974, Bhutto was facing daunting political challenges that led him to make concessions after concessions to the ROs. He was facing political opposition from Wali Khan's National Awami Party (NAP) and tribal leaders in Baluchistan such as Nawab Akbar Bugti. The ROs had joined in with the opposition, which had increased their strength. Bhutto, therefore, had to address the demands by ROs. One such demand, which had remained pending since the 1950s, was to declare Ahmedis as non-Muslims. In April 1974, clashes between Ahmedis and members of ROs erupted in Rabwa, which were used by the ROs to put further pressure on the government to declare them non-Muslims. Bhutto referred the issue to the National Assembly, which approved the bill declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims. Bhutto himself did not attend the 30-day-long debate on the bill, but during the final vote, he voted in favor of the bill. In addition to declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims, this bill stipulated that they could not hold higher positions in public offices. Therefore, it was significant in way that it accepted the demands of ROs to exclude a minority group from being an equal member of the society. The acceptance of this bill, when viewed in correct political context of the time, suggests that the government adopted exclusionary policies to appease the growing political opposition of which ROs were a part.

5. Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization of the Country

General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977 as a result of violent protests by the opposition under the banner of the PNA. ROs had provided street support to PNA through their followers. They considered Bhutto's socialist policies as un-Islamic; therefore, they had joined hands with the opposition political parties. Zia-ul-Haq had understood the significance of ROs in political landscape. Being a devout religious person himself, Zia used religion to strengthen his support base. In doing so, he made considerable concessions to ROs, such as JI, which was the most influential RO at the time. Hashmi states, "The Jamat-e-Islami was of critical importance to Zia. It was the

only party with a committed cadre of loyalists that stood in readiness to counter and blunt any anti-Zia agitation launched by any political force.”²⁰⁹ She further argues, “None of the two sides had a purely religious goal—it was more a matter of gaining legitimacy among the public than anything else.”²¹⁰ Support for ROs by Zia for political purpose is thus clear.

At the same time, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1980, which was considered by Zia as a security challenge to Pakistan. To address Soviet question, Zia decided to use religiously motivated *mujahideen* to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In order to reach out to the religiously motivated people to fight a war in Afghanistan, the Zia government co-opted ROs to do what was needed. This further strengthened the ties between the state and the ROs, which were given huge amounts of weapons and money to fight a war against communism on behalf of Pakistan and U.S.²¹¹ While the war was going on in Afghanistan, ROs had raised their demands to enforce Sharia Law, which was promised by the 1973 Constitution. To maintain the allegiance of ROs, Zia set up a Federal Shariat Court, which was given “the power to strike down any law or administrative action as un-Islamic—if it violated the fundamental laws of Islam.”²¹² Other measures to enforce Sharia laws were also taken, which included Islamic punishments (i.e., amputation of hands for theft, stoning to death and lashing for adultery and drinking); the revised education policy of 1979, which laid special emphasis on the projection of Islamic teaching and ideology of Pakistan in the syllabi of various classes; liberal funds were made available for religious education; and a compulsory tax—Zakat—(2.5 percent annual deduction from savings accounts and other investments).²¹³

²⁰⁹ Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 10.

²¹¹ Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Political Islam, the Jamaat-e-Islami and Pakistan’s Role in the Afghan Soviet War, 1979–1988,” in *Religion and the Cold War*, ed. Philip Emil Muehlenbeck (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press: 2012), 280, <http://books.google.com/books?id=ytEC2bOstFUC&pg=PA279&lpg=PA279&dq=Jamaat+e+Islami+and+Zia&source=bl&ots=bOOpOparovb&sig=GIMfHz0L73z-HXgxBCChqkFBopWE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=giZnVJT3JcisogSY54GICw&ved=0CEcQ6AEwCDgU#v=onepage&q=Jamaat%20e%20Islami%20and%20Zia&f=false>.

²¹² Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military & Politics in Pakistan, 1947–1997* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), 248.

²¹³ Ibid.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a Pakistani political scientist and military analyst, argues, “The Islamization process had its problems. A number of Muslim sects who did not share the establishment’s perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their religious sensitivities.”²¹⁴ For example, the members of Shia sect staged a massive protest in Islamabad in the summer of 1980 against the compulsory deduction of ‘Zakat’ by the government.²¹⁵ “The government fearing the protest might trigger agitation in other cities, with political parties jumping on the bandwagon, gave in and made ‘Zakat’ voluntary for the Shia sect.”²¹⁶ Askari argues that the exclusionary policies of the Zia’s Islamization process has led to “tension between the Shias and one of the most conservative Sunni sect—the Wahabis. Similarly the Wahabi-Barelvi differences have become pronounced.”²¹⁷ Therefore, when Zia was trying to appease the ROs, he had to make concessions to them in the form of implementation of Sharia law, which was based on the interpretation by a particular sect. This created strife between the dominant Wahabi-Deobandi sects and the rest of the sects. Husain Haqqani argues that “[o]ne faction of the Jamiat Ulema Islam comprising clerics from the influential Deobandi school joined in the distribution of charity received from Arab countries and in setting up madrassas.”²¹⁸ During the period of Soviet Afghan War, Deobandi ROs received considerable amount of financial support from the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, which enabled them to increase their influence in the society through charity and networks of madrassas. It may be worth mentioning here that Zia’s personal ideology was in sync with the Deobandi ideology, and therefore, most of the Islamization process predominantly followed the Deobandi ideology. Hashmi observes that, “with a number of sects and varied types of ‘Islam,’ the Deobandi school of thought became the official school to research theoretical explanations.”²¹⁹ Zia preferred one particular sect for interpretation and implementation of Sharia; this led to marginalization of other sects. It

²¹⁴ Rizvi, *Military & Politics in Pakistan*, 248–49.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6.

can be argued that Zia's policy was exclusionary of minor sects and religions, therefore, further aggravated the sectarian strife and promoted extremism.

6. General Pervez Musharraf and ROs

As discussed previously, the state has made concessions to ROs that led to extremist policies adopted by the state. On the other hand, rulers like Musharraf that had tried to marginalize ROs and propose liberal policies have resulted in strong opposition from the influential ROs. General Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999 because of a bloodless *coup d'état* against then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf introduced the concept of "enlightened moderation," which demanded the "Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift."²²⁰ He wanted to de-radicalize the Pakistani society by promoting more liberal and tolerant policies. As a first step he proposed a minor amendment in the blasphemy law.²²¹ He further proposed changes in the Hudood Ordinance; these changes were aimed at providing protection to rape victims. In addition, he banned the militant outfits and associated welfare organizations of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed (JEM).²²² His efforts, however, angered the religious groups and ROs, which successfully compelled him to retreat from the proposed amendments. Such efforts to amend the religious laws provided the ROs with an opportunity to increase their propaganda against the government, which was already experiencing violent acts of terrorism for its support of the U.S. war on terror. Further fuel to fire against Musharraf came because of operations against militants who had taken control of *Lal Masjid* (red mosque) in the country's capital city of Islamabad.²²³ These

²²⁰ Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation," *Washington Post*, 1 June 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html>.

²²¹ The blasphemy law in Pakistan was modified during Zia-ul-Haq rule, 1980–86, to include minimum penalty of death for making derogatory remarks against Islam and Islamic personages and scriptures; for more, see "What are Pakistani Blasphemy Laws," BBC, 4 November 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12621225>; Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Deference to the Mullahs, Iron Fist for the Rest: Pakistan under Musharraf," *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 40 (7–13 October 2006): 4232, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4418775>.

²²² Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, P.R. Chari, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 168.

²²³ "Musharraf Cracks down Radical Islamist Terror," *Economic Times*, 11 July 2007, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-07-11/news/27690525_1_islamist-terror-islamist-militants-islamabad-s-lal-masjid.

actions against the extremist groups weakened the political support for Musharraf, while on the other hand strengthened the propaganda of extremist elements. His actions against extremist outfits resulted in three attacks on his life. He survived two terrorist attacks aimed to kill him; a third was averted.²²⁴ Musharraf was being portrayed as a “supporting agenda of enemies of Islam under the smart title of ‘enlightened moderation.’”²²⁵ On the one hand, Musharraf was supported by the Western powers including the United States; on the other hand, he lost support from a larger base that was mobilized against him by the ROs using religion as the driving force. He could not succeed in his anti-extremist policies. His government’s kinetic actions against militants resulted in increased terrorist attacks and further radicalization.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that religion has been used for political reasons even during the creation of the country. Subsequently, most of the governments have used religion for political gains for which they had to make concessions to the ROs. This in turn has led the state to accept demands of ROs to adopt policies that lead to extremism in society.

The problem of religious extremism in Pakistan has become complex. Pakistan is an Islamic state and its constitution should reflect that; however, the constitutional role of religion has created space for extremist ROs to prosper and promote extremism in society. Implementation of Shariah law is contested *per se*; various sects have different interpretations of Shariah law, therefore, adopting an interpretation of one sect has resulted in violent response from others. Hashmi argues:

With a number of sects and varied types of “Islam,” the Deobandi school of thought became the official school to look up to for theoretical explanations. With its close resemblance to Saudi Wahabism, Saudi

²²⁴ Bill Roggio, “Assassination Attempt against Pakistan’s President,” *Long War Journal*, 6 July 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/apparent_assassinati.php.

²²⁵ Abid Ullah Jan, *The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan to Inevitable Demise* (Canada: Pragmatic Publishing, 2005), 47.

Arabia became the patronizing factor, even though a majority of Pakistanis was and still adhere to the Brelvi/Sufi tradition of Islam.²²⁶

The ambiguity in implementing a version of Shariah law has therefore become a cause of extremism. Thomas Jefferson wrote, “When principles are well understood, their application is less embarrassing,” whereas, in the case of Pakistan, the ambiguities remain. Hasan Askari Rizvi argues, “A number of Muslim sects who did not share the establishment’s perspective on Islam resented the lack of adequate attention to their religious sensitivities.”²²⁷

Attempts to change the clauses in the constitution that have the potential to be used against minorities have been responded to with violence by extremist ROs. Musharraf’s efforts to marginalize ROs and take action against the extremist ROs have further increased the intensity of violence by the extremist groups. Therefore, any policy to counter extremism in Pakistan will have to be cognizant of reactions by the ROs, which have become a formidable challenge for the state.

²²⁶ Hashmi, “Pakistan, Politics, Religion, and Extremism,” 6.

²²⁷ Rizvi, *Military & Politics in Pakistan*, 248–49.

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated that ROs in Pakistan have a socio-economic link with society through the provision of public goods and welfare to society. Members of society who benefit from the welfare activities of the ROs become supporters of these institutions. Moreover, some selected ROs in Pakistan have adopted extreme views due to the political and social context in the country that forces them to compete for resources using Islamist extremism. They then use this socio-economic link to indoctrinate citizens with extremist ideologies, thus creating a foundational acceptance of terrorism as a justified activity. Further, this link enables ROs to mobilize society for their interests, such as to pressure the state to gain concessions or compel the state to pass extremist laws. The state responds to ROs because of their influence over a considerable segment of society. At times, the state also needs the ROs to mobilize the population for the state's interest. Therefore, the state accepts the demands of ROs—including those that require adoption and implementation of extremist laws, which further contribute to extremism.

The second chapter demonstrated that ROs in Pakistan have a history of carrying out social services and helping the poor. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the state sponsored a particular sect, which marginalized other sects. This action had a profound effect on the conduct of ROs, who thus became competitive in expanding their influence on society. The case of JI and JUD are instructive, for understanding that in order to increase their influence, the ROs have engaged in social services. JI and JUD have expansive welfare networks all over the country. They have been able to provide social and welfare services in the areas where the government has been unable to provide such services. These ROs have maintained their link with the poor. Their influence on the poor provides them with the leverage necessary to gain concessions and resources from the state. Therefore, the ROs remain engaged in competitive welfare activities to increase their influence over segments of society belonging to lower and lower-middle classes. It is important to understand the link between religious organizations and the poor to further our understanding of the dependence of the state on religious groups to mobilize the poor. The state has been unable to meet the basic social needs of the poor, and therefore, the

poor have become disenfranchised by the state and come under the influence of religious organizations. This situation benefits ROs, for they can bargain for compensation from the state. By realizing the link between the poor and ROs, the state can form policies to address the social requisites of the poor in order to weaken the power base of ROs. Some of these ROs have adopted extremist ideologies and because they maintain influence over society through socio-welfare networks, they promote extremism in society.

Chapter III illustrated that some ROs in Pakistan use religious symbols to promote extremism. ROs in Pakistan have existed since the creation of the country. Yet during the mid-1970s, there was an exponential rise in creation of new ROs on the basis of sectarianism. This increase in the number of sectarian ROs, coupled with the funding of some ROs from foreign countries and the Pakistani government, is related to the increase in violence and terrorism within the country. Such a relationship suggests that the ROs in Pakistan operate in a competitive environment where each RO strives to claim a monopoly over religion. The ROs can be seen as rational actors who want to maximize their benefits in terms of demanding resources from the state, increase their membership, and marginalize their competitors. To maximize their benefits, some ROs resort to extreme measures, including the use of violence and the promotion of extremism in society. *Madrasas* provide foot soldiers to the extremist ROs, which carry out acts of violence to prove that they are a significant factor and that the state must respond to their demands. Understanding these ROs in the context of rational actors who are trying to compete in a market of ideologies is therefore necessary to comprehend why and how these ROs promote extremism in the society. This understanding is important in formulating policies to counter extremism in Pakistan. The role of the state in favoring one sect can exacerbate the situation because the other sects feel marginalized and disenfranchised. They also feel threatened by the growing influence of the favored sect and thus take up violent measures to protect their interests and seek resources from the state. The support for these ROs comes from people who are dissatisfied with the existing system. Therefore, the effectiveness of the state in providing social and economic support to its people can limit the membership of these extremist ROs.

Chapter IV illustrated that religion has been used for political reasons even during the creation of the country. Subsequently, most of the governments used religion for political gains for which they had to make concessions to the ROs. This in turn has led the state to accept demands of ROs to adopt policies that lead to extremism in society.

The problem of religious extremism in Pakistan has become complex. Pakistan is an Islamic state and its constitution should reflect that; however, the availability of resources for Islamist activities has created space for competition among ROs who prosper and promote extremism in society. Implementation of Shariah law is contested *per se*; various sects have different interpretations of Shariah law; therefore, adopting the interpretation of one sect has resulted in violent responses from others. Attempts to change the clauses in the constitution that have the potential to be used against minorities have been responded to with violence by extremist ROs. Musharraf's efforts to marginalize ROs and take action against the extremist ROs further increased the intensity of violence by the extremist groups. Therefore, any policy to counter extremism in Pakistan will have to be cognizant of reactions by the ROs, which have become a formidable challenge for the state.

This thesis has illustrated that when the state relies on ROs for political expediency it contributes to extremism. ROs in Pakistan have gained considerable influence over the society, which allows them to promote extremism. The state has depended on ROs for political reasons, which has led it to adopt exclusionary policies to appease ROs. Such policies marginalize minority religions and sects, which resort to violence to attract attention of the state. Therefore, in order to get rid of extremism in Pakistan, the state needs to adopt policies that do not provide patronage to selective ROs. Following are recommended in this regard:

- Lack of governance provides ROs with the space to maintain links with the poor and disenfranchised population through their socio-welfare activities. This provides them with the influence over a sizeable population, which enables them to bargain with the state. Therefore, the Pakistani state needs to ensure that its citizens are provided with social goods and services. This will eliminate the cause of influence that ROs have over the society. On the other hand, this will provide legitimacy to the government for which it needs support of ROs.

- The state needs to distance itself from patronage of selective ROs. In the past, this has led to competition among ROs that have adopted extremist ideologies to compete for money and power.
- Some of the ROs have links with terrorist outfits. The state needs to closely monitor the activities of ROs to identify those ROs that have links to the terrorists. This will be possible only if the government keeps itself neutral and does not provide patronage to selective ROs.
- With regard to academic research, this thesis has highlighted that there is a lack of empirical data to gauge the influence of ROs on the society. Therefore, in order to better understand the role of ROs in promoting extremism, an empirical research is warranted to measure the influence of ROs over the society.

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